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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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1 April 1986

## WORLDWIDE REPORT

## ARMS CONTROL

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## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: WEINBERGER, UK'S YOUNGER DISCUSS 'STAR WARS' TIES

LD182235 Moscow TASS in English 2132 GMT 18 Mar 86

[Text] London March 18 TASS -- TASS correspondent Nikolay Pakhomov reports: Casper Weinberger, U.S. secretary of defence, who is on a tour of Western Europe on the eve of opening in the FRG of a scheduled meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, is currently staying in the British capital. Whitehall has made no official statements on the visit, yet the TASS correspondent was told at the British Defence Department that Caspar Weinberger has met with his British counterpart George Younger to discuss a number of military problems, including arms control and Britain's participation in the research programmes within the framework of the U.S. "Strategic Defence Initiative."

In the opinion of local observers, the discussion of the question of "arms control" actually centred on coordinating Washington's and London's efforts to block any progress on this field. The arrival of the American hawk to the banks of the Thames has coincided with the confirmation by the British Government of its refusal to give a positive response to the Soviet peace initiatives directed at curbing the weapons race and eliminating nuclear weapons stage-by-stage.

The Tory Cabinet's servile following of Washington's lead, its obstructionist policy have been strongly criticised by Denis Healey, foreign secretary in the Labour Party "shadow cabinet." Speaking in a BBC television interview, he accused the government of surrender and of invariably yielding to American pressure in its wish to accommodate itself to the Reagan administration's stand.

Meanwhile, Denis Healey stressed, even many American experts, who earlier took part in talks with the Soviet Union, consider this stand to be totally "unrealistic." The Labour figure has strongly condemned the support by the British Government of the refusal of the USA to join in the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions.

As far as the discussion of the "star wars" plans at the meeting of Caspar Weinberger with George Younger is concerned, the talks, in the opinion of observers, centred on a further broadening of cooperation of the USA and Britain in implementing that programme directed at militarizing outer space.

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## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: U.S. WANTS TO DRAW ALLIES INTO SDI DEVELOPMENT

LD181050 Moscow TASS in English 1024 GMT 18 Mar 86

["Why USA Endeavours To Draw Allies Into SDI" -- TASS item identifier]

[Text] Washington March 18 TASS -- TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko reports:

Attempts are being made in the U.S. capital to present the Pentagon's insistent efforts to draw the USA's allies into development efforts within the framework of the "Strategic Defence Initiative" (SDI) as a manifestation of good will with regard to those countries and of concern for their security. In actual fact the Pentagon concerns itself, first of all, with a search for most-suitable-to-the-USA forms of attracting the best foreign minds, foreign capital and technology to tasks under the "star wars" program, and on such conditions which would be of benefit only to the United States. Such a directedness of the USA's "allied friendship" is confirmed by the results of the recent visits to Washington by the delegations of the FRG and Italy. The delegations consisted of representatives of the governments of those countries, scientists, and technical specialists.

They were received, in particular, by Richard Perle, U.S. assistant secretary of defence, and by Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, director of the SDI organisation.

Data which have filtered into the press indicates that U.S. intentions to "milk" its allies without committing itself in any substantial way to the observance of the commercial and technological interests of the "friends", aroused considerable misgivings among the members of the Delegations. The misgivings are that the USA's allies, counting on the promised profits from participation in the SDI, would be completely deprived of independence in the exploration and study of outer space even for peaceful purposes. They would be bound to observe utter secrecy of the development efforts, including those related to their own industries.

Commenting on the results of the visits to the USA by the delegations of the FRG and Italy, the Washington weekly DEFENCE NEWS points out precisely these problems. The weekly writes that the Italians stated that they would not assume any concrete obligations under the SDI until Washington gave firm guarantees concerning the observance of the commercial and industrial interests of its allies, as well as those concerning the observance of the copyright for inventions, discoveries, and products themselves.

Such is the commercial aspect of the matter. However, there is also another important aspect of the U.S. attempts at "getting" its allies in the SDI. The idea is to make them share responsibility for the consequences of the realisation of the SDI. In spite of Washington's assurances that the "star wars" program is ostensibly a "purely defensive" one, major specialists, among them American ones, on the strength of facts show that the creation and deployment of space weapon systems would sharply destabilise the strategic situation in the world and would immeasurably increase the risk of an outbreak of nuclear war. Should that occur, Washington would like to have grounds to tell its allies: "Dear friends, we have been in this together, so mum's the word!"

Would not it be better for everyone jointly to secure that space weapon systems are never created and, still less, orbited? This is precisely what the Soviet Union is suggesting, striving to prevent an upsetting of stability in the world, a transfer of the arms race to outer space, and a growth of the threat of an all-out nuclear disaster. There is still time to secure that.

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## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### FRENCH REPORT CONCLUDES SDI PLANS 'UNREALISTIC'

PM131537 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Mar 86 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "The Pentagon Intends To Continue"]

[Text] Washington, 11 Mar -- According to U.S. press reports, within Pentagon circles attention has been drawn to a report on "star wars" published by the French Defense Ministry's respected Space Armaments Commission. The report's main conclusion is that the creation of a "space shield" using the notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative" is unrealistic.

The commission, headed by J.F. Delpech, a leader of the National Scientific Research Center, includes specialists from the Defense Ministry, the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Space Research Center, and a number of other leading French research centers and institutions.

Analyzing in detail the "arguments" of the supporters of the creation [sozdaniye] of an ABM system with space-based elements, French specialists state that even if the creation [sozdaniye] of "permanently operating lasers" is possible in around 10 years, "future ballistic missiles could be quite easily defended against them." The creation [sozdaniye] of other types of weapons based on the principles of directed energy is "problematic" in the view of the report's authors. The space-based ABM system itself "will undoubtedly be highly vulnerable both to another analogous system and to anti-satellite weapons deployed on earth," the report notes.

Nevertheless, the Pentagon envisages a further acceleration of the work to create [sozdaniye] space strike arms. As Lieutenant General J. Abrahamson, director of the "star wars" program, has stated in the U.S. Congress, it is planned in the next fiscal year to accelerate the creation [sozdaniye] of a space plane which will be able to put armaments into near-earth orbit and independently carry out the functions of a space strike weapon as well as working in the laser weapon sphere. According to Abrahamson, the first stage of work under the SDI program is complete, and it is now planned to study more carefully the problems connected with it.

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## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### SOVIET PAPER ON WESTERN EUROPE SDI 'RACE'

PM131523 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 12 Mar 86 First Edition p 5

[Article by M. Kalachev: "Where the 'Space Track' Leads: The Obstacle Race"]

[Text] It is an unusual sport. In terms of both its nature and its participants. Equally bewildering is its "top prize," of which it can be said in advance that it will bring joy to no one. Or virtually no one.

The race began in March 1983, when the U.S. President made a speech which has entered the history of international politics as the "star wars" speech. Even then no one in the United States thought that America could handle the very complex technologies and economic aspects of the plan on its own. A large measure of responsibility was invested in its NATO allies. And, as is usual with the Americans, this was done without any kind of consultation with them.

Washington at the same time announced a "contest" for its European and non-European allies. And the race was on.

Few of the "runners" wanted to compete in the SDI stakes. But after the administration of stimulants in the form of ultimatums and threats, which is traditional in relations between the United States and its European allies, Western Europe as a whole took up positions on the American "space race track."

Britain was first off the mark. After signing a so-called "memorandum on mutual understanding" at the beginning of December 1985, Britain was the first and to date the only U.S. European ally to conclude an agreement on Strategic Defense Initiative participation at an interstate level. With undisguised satisfaction U.S. Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger stated that "it emphasizes the close nature of the alliance between the two countries and the special nature of our relationship, which is of vital importance for both our countries."

In horseracing parlance, one could say that Bonn and Rome are trailing half a length behind London. The FRG Government has agreed to its country's participation in SDI, but only at the level of private firms. The Italian Government made the same decision literally a few days ago. True, it does not alter the core of the matter, but it does afford the opportunity to talk about independence and boldness.

The main group of participants is a long way behind the leaders: Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, and other countries. They are, in a manner of speaking, participating in SDI, but their hearts are not in it. The parliaments do not make recommendations, the governments do not exactly raise objections, private firms are willing but are not champing at the bit either... Naturally, such "decadent liberalism" provokes anger on the Potomac. Of course, the contribution made to SDI by the minor countries of Europe is not going to be crucial, but where is Atlantic solidarity?!

A number of West European countries, despite everything, are rejecting the American invitation to take part in SDI. These include, among others, Sweden and Greece.

Why, then, is Western Europe as a whole taking part in the "space race"? There are several reasons. First, fear of showing allied disloyalty to the United States. Second, Washington pressure. Third, SDI champions in Western Europe ascribe their upsurge to a desire not to lag behind in the high technology of the future, which, allegedly, only "star wars" can give to a fading Europe.

However, the main incentive for taking part in this dangerous program is the ardent desire of West European monopolies to obtain a slice of the immense profits which SDI promises. It is this greed and pursuit of promised millions which spur private capital and the governments of Western Europe that protect its interests to step on to the "star wars" running track.

The CPSU Central Committee Political Report, delivered to the 27th CPSU Congress by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, says: "We have expressed our attitude toward 'star wars' in sufficient detail. The United States has already embroiled many of its allies in the program. The venture threatens to become irreversible in nature. It is highly imperative that a realistic solution be found before it is too late -- a solution ENSURING THAT THE ARMS RACE IS NOT TRANSFERRED INTO OUTER SPACE. The 'star wars' program must not be allowed to be used either as an incentive to a further arms race or as an impediment to radical disarmament."

This way of thinking -- the only feasible one today -- is winning an ever-increasing number of supporters throughout the world, including Western Europe. The following thought was expressed by the British conservative commentator Peregrine Worsthorne, a man it is difficult to suspect of harboring undue sympathy for the Soviet Union: "On SDI," he wrote in London's SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, "M.S. Gorbachev voices the thoughts of very many Europeans, who are virtually as resolutely set against this project as he."

A race has a point when at its finish the victors can expect the prize for which the whole thing has been organized. The space race competitors also expect a reward. But it is a strange prize: Outer space stuffed with weapons capable at any moment of unleashing a deadly rain upon the earth. The very attempt to implement the program will become an insuperable obstacle to any endeavors to remove the threat of a third world war and mankind's self-destruction.

Thus what we have is a race to set up an obstacle. Does it have any point at all?

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## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### FRG OFFICIALS ON ROLE IN SDI, EUREKA, 'TECHNOLOGICAL EUROPE'

Duesseldorf VDI NACHRICHTEN in German 27 Dec 85 p 3

[Text] The American research program SDI and the European Eureka Program drafted as a countermove have heavily influenced scientific and political discussion in the Federal Republic of Germany over the past year. The EEC Commission in Brussels has finally initiated another "Technological Europe" plan. Linked to all of these concepts are hopes that technology will experience a spurt of growth on the eve of the 21st century.

1985 was a year of technological, scientific and political decisions which will have a critical influence on the directions taken by research in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Europe as a whole, for the coming decade at least.

Three important developments were decisive: First, there was the West German government's decision in principle, made during the last week before Christmas, to participate in the American SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) project. Second, at the beginning of November, there was the strengthening, once again, of the decision by 17 European nations to breathe life into the Eureka (European Research Coordination Agency) project. Finally, there was the plan formulated at the end of November by the Twelve nations of the European Economic Community, to create a European domestic market beginning January 1, 1986, and, parallel to this, a "Technological Europe."

The diversity of this research and technology policy, which, superficially at least, seems to have little homogeneity, is puzzling and confusing. However, behind all three concepts, the transatlantic project (SDI) and both European ones (Eureka and "technological Europe") are general political appraisals of the world's technological development and the role of the Federal Republic of Germany and Europe in this process.

Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauss and the EEC commissioner in charge of research and new technologies in Brussels, Karl-Heinz Narjes, represent both ends of the spectrum in terms of their appraisal of this situation. Strauss, who has advocated SDI from the beginning, believes that the \$60 billion which the American government has set aside for SDI will usher in an era of tremendous technical progress. Failure of the West German government to participate, he feels, would be tantamount to scientific and political suicide.

Narjes, as a representative of the EEC, thinks otherwise. For him, favoring SDI means abandoning Europe as a technological community, and this at a time

when such a community is just beginning to take shape. Narjes also sees the Eureka Project, with its headquarters in Strassburg, as a dangerous splintering of European research efforts.

There is one thing which the positions defended by Strauss and Narjes have in common, however: both are based on the threat to the economic competitiveness of the Federal Republic of Germany and Europe as a whole which comes out of the American and Japanese challenge--with these two countries probably soon to be followed by the Taiwanese and the Koreans, as well. Both the proponents of SDI and those of the European project want to meet this challenge. Where they differ is in how this should be done.

What is behind SDI, Eureka and the "technological Europe" plan? In terms of SDI: With their Strategic Defense Initiative, the Americans want to have by the mid 1990's a laser weapon system stationed in space, capable of destroying any intercontinental rocket immediately after takeoff. Such a system would require substantial innovations not only in laser development, but also in computer technology: experts estimate that in the event of a nuclear conflict, at least 10,000 Soviet atomic warheads would be launched at the U.S., along with nearly 100,000 dummy warheads. Computers would have to be able to determine which should be shot down. Critics doubt the technical feasibility of such a plan and warn that the arms race may be intensified as a result of SDI.

The West German government, especially Chancellor Kohl, has always emphasized that it only wanted to participate in the research end of the SDI program, not the practical implementation of the system. And the American government's \$60 billion were enough of a guarantee that something would come of the project.

With regard to the Eureka Project: Despite all protestations to the contrary by German and French politicians, Eureka was a reaction to SDI. The brainchild of current French Prime Minister Laurent Fabius and German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, the project was outlined in initial proposals which showed an embarrassing similarity, in terms of content, to the SDI research plans. There was one important difference, of course: in the Eureka project the emphasis was on civilian applications from the very beginning, in contrast to the predominantly military goals of SDI. Ten projects have been adopted so far by the 17 nations participating in Eureka. 1. European standard for microcomputers. 2. Development of a vector computer. 3. Production of amorphous silicon. 4. Development of a robot for textile manufacture. 5. Development of membranous filters. 6. Development of a high-performance laser. 7. Program for measuring the occurrence and radioactivity of environmentally significant trace elements throughout Europe. 8. European research network. 9. Diagnostic system for diseases communicable through sexual contact. 10. Flexible production system based on optical signals.

The Eureka project has found its staunchest supporter in Federal Research Minister Heinz Riesenhuber: "What the Eureka project is intended to provide is, on the one hand, a unified market in Europe, and on the other, improved living conditions for the people of Europe. These two goals are inseparable. Eureka should create a governmental framework within which individual initiative can develop, but where the government does not hand down edicts." Eureka would be

organized so that partners with matching interests would work together on specific projects. The organization as a whole would be directed by a small, flexible, unbureaucratic secretariat in Strassburg. Says Riesenhuber: "The government will not be luring companies with subsidies. However, in individual cases checks will be made to determine whether subsidiaries can be assisted financially." Obviously there is no comparison here with the \$60 billion in subsidies provided by the U.S. government to spur technological advances. Instead, the project will rely on the ability of the European scientific and research communities to do their own organizing.

Finally, there is the "technological Europe" plan. This initiative is supported by the member governments of the European Economic Community, and especially by the president of the EEC Commission, Jacques Delors. Here again, the intention is to try to unify the European domestic market, especially in the areas of new technologies, norms, standards, and the expansion of joint research through existing programs. The first handicap, however, is the sluggishness of the bureaucratic headquarters in Brussels. The second handicap: no money. Every year the EEC manages to steer clear of bankruptcy by subsidizing agriculture. In 1984, the EEC budget had over 38 billion ecus (1 ecu = 2.21 DM) allotted for payments and liabilities under its farm policy, as opposed to only 1.3 billion ecus for research. With this kind of background, the "technological Europe" project does not give much cause for hope.

The debate on SDI and Eureka is not over yet, however, either in the FRG or in Europe as a whole. The French have refused any participation in SDI, while the British have been the first European nation to conclude a skeleton agreement with the Americans toward joint work on the project; significantly, this agreement was signed by the defense ministers of both countries. Moreover, the decision by the West German government to participate in the SDI project was based only secondarily on scientific, technical and political factors, and was brought about primarily by national security considerations and the desire to maintain political alliances. This was recently emphasized once again by Chancellor Kohl.

There are doubts about both SDI and Eureka in the Federal Republic of Germany as well. The president of the DIHT (German Industry and Trade Commission), Otto Wolff von Amerongen, warned against excessive hopes that participation in SDI will prove to be a cure-all for the economy, but also against a return to "subsidy-ism" as a result of the Eureka program. He also pointed out the largely identical requirements of Eureka and the EEC initiative for a "technological Europe," and the associated risk of awarding duplicate grants. Similar reservations have been voiced both by industry and by the scientific community. For example, the Federal Association of German Industries would only comment that Eureka "could be of use" to European research and industry. SKI, Eureka, and the "technological Europe" project will be taking more definite shape over the next few years. Whatever the final form of these programs, they will be determining the main directions taken by science, research and industry for the next decade.

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CSO: 3698/323



## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG FDP EXPERT URGES 'CAREFUL NEGOTIATIONS' WITH U.S.

LD151721 Hamburg DPA in German 1311 GMT 15 Jan 86

[Text] Bonn, 15 Jan (DPA) -- FDP defense expert Olaf Feldmann has called on the Federal Government not to let the negotiations which Economics Minister Martin Bangemann (FDP) is conducting in the United States on the exchange of scientific and technological research results be put under time pressure. Such pressure, which is being exerted by, for example, CSU Chairman Franz Josef Strauss, can in no way be justified from the point of view of German interests, Feldmann said in Bonn on Wednesday.

Thorough and careful negotiations are necessary, especially because of the negative experiences in past years. For example, despite agreements to the contrary, the United States still practices arms cooperation as a "one-way street." In view of the increasing complaints from German scientists that they are coming up against closed doors at American congresses, "the accusation of a hostile tendency toward Europe in the U.S. scientific world" is "not completely incomprehensible," Feldmann said. The extent to which Bangemann succeeds in achieving equal rights is, therefore, of great importance for German-U.S. cooperation.

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CSO: 5200/2631

## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### FRG SDI NEGOTIATING DELEGATION LEAVES FOR U.S.

LD121044 Hamburg DPA in German 0932 GMT 12 Mar 86

[Text] Bonn, 12 Mar (DPA) -- The Bonn government delegation to negotiate with the United States on an improvement in the exchange of technology and participation by German companies in the U.S. space research program, SDI, has flew to Washington today (Wednesday). The Federal Government has repeatedly expressed the hope that the negotiations will be concluded by Easter.

Evidently strict U.S. demands which could delay the conclusion have caused Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl to write a letter to U.S. President Ronald Reagan. Responsible government circles said Kohl reiterated in this letter of last Monday [10 March] the familiar German views. These include, in particular, the demand for fairness in the use and exploitation of research findings in the SDI program which are gained jointly. Also unchanged is the German view that it will not participate in the SDI project on a governmental level.

Kohl evidently considered his letter to Reagan necessary in order to support the Bonn negotiating delegation headed by Lorenz Schomerus, head of the Foreign Trade Department in the Federal Economics Ministry. It has also become known in Bonn that Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher intends to become involved again, by explaining the German negotiating position once more to his counterpart, George Shultz, directly. An opportunity for this could occur at the funeral ceremony for the murdered Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme in Stockholm over the weekend.

Government circles in Bonn now do not want to rule out the possibility, either, that an agreement will be delayed for even longer. There are considerably more problems with the negotiations than had been expected. The two sides are currently trying to reconcile several points of their differing texts of the draft agreement. According to reliable reports from the government side, only the preamble is completely undisputed so far.

A success in the negotiations which could lead to an agreement being ready for signing during the visit to the FRG of U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, due in 9 days' time, is thought improbable in Bonn. Moreover, government circles stressed that they knew nothing of Weinberger's reported wish to be able to sign the agreement then.

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CSO: 5200/2651

## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG: SPD OPPOSES SIGNING OF SDI AGREEMENT WITH U.S.

### Statement Released

LD111154 Hamburg DPA in German 1029 GMT 11 Mar 86

[Text] Bonn, 11 Mar (DPA) -- The SPD executive committee has urgently appealed to the Federal Government to leave the "wrong track" of German participation in the U.S. SDI program and European Defense Initiative (EDI). Against the background of the USSR's willingness to permit comprehensive on-the-spot verification it is a "central issue of the Federal Republic's credibility" to advocate the immediate halt to deployment of medium-range missiles and nuclear tests by the two superpowers, a statement released by the SPD in Bonn on Monday says.

The Social Democrats also advocated giving up the deployment of new nuclear weapons and their carrier systems, the testing of nuclear warheads and the development and testing of antisatellite and other space-based weapons. The Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva led to an improved atmosphere and constructive, far-reaching disarmament proposals. "This progress must be followed up with deeds," to ensure that not all peace efforts are being thwarted by the arms issue, the Social Democrats demanded.

The SPD appealed to its members to raise the SPD's demands concerning disarmament during the forthcoming Easter marches. The leadership body acknowledged that the peace movement has sharpened awareness of the dangers to peace and introduced alternatives to the deterrent system into the discussion over the past few years. The SPD appealed to its followers to continue their work in this spirit and not to become resigned.

### Rau Comments

LD110957 Hamburg DPA in German 0004 GMT 11 Mar 86

[Text] Hannover, 11 Mar (DPA) -- SPD candidate chancellor Johannes Rau has demanded from the Federal Government "a new effort, a second phase of the policy of detente" in order to give better chances of success to the disarmament process. In an interview in NEUE PRESSE (Hannover/Tuesday's edition) Rau said he thought there are better chances today than a year ago that there would be "qualified changes in the weapon arsenals". However, "much will depend on whether and to what extent the Germans and Europeans will manage to have their interests taken into account in the negotiation process." It is important "to continue more consistently than in the past 3 years what was begun by Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt."

The U.S. representatives also did not give in with regard to the problem of exploiting German contribution. According to their opinion, all exploitation rights belong to the U.S. contractor because he is the one who pays. Perle and his aides were not even prepared to pass on future SDI research results for European defense purpose. They made just a general statement: Research results regarding defense against ballistic missiles could contribute to promote defense "against other threats."

The Americans used the opportunity for some intimidation, saying that they could give in on that point if the Federal Government engaged stronger in the SDI program.

Even little things were the subject of quarrel. No agreement was achieved on a Berlin clause, as if East-West talks were held. The Americans do not want the two other Berlin occupation forces, the British and the French, to learn about the memorandum's text.

As the agreement with Great Britain, the memorandum is also considered a secret matter, only a few parts of it will probably be published. The Germans could not prevail with the objection that it is hard to treat a document on the promotion of industrial interests as a confidential matter.

According to the impression of the German group, the positions have hardened: The American preparedness to make concessions is low, while pressure for quick conclusion of the agreement, is great. The explanation is that the U.S. Government does not want to jeopardize its forthcoming talks with Japan and Italy through too many concessions. It fears that otherwise the British could demand changes in their contract.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who will come on 21 March to the FRG to attend the nuclear planning group's meeting, already indicated that he could sign the memorandum of understanding on that occasion. It is clear to Bonn whom Weinberger wants to have as his pet partner: The Federal Government represented by FRG Defense Minister Manfred Woerner.

#### Spokesmen Comment

LD101559 Hamburg DPA in German 1458 GMT 10 Mar 86

[Text] Bonn, 10 Mar (DPA) -- The Federal Government still intends to sign an agreement with the United States on SDI (program of research for space-based missile defense) before Easter. Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost countered reports today (Monday) in Bonn that there are difficulties in the talks with Washington. The negotiations are still under way. The German group of experts will travel again this very week to the United States to coordinate the proposed texts of the agreement.

The Ministry of Economics spokesman admitted that the SDI agreement has been given priority for reasons of time and that the general technology agreement can be concluded later. The spokesman will not say whether there are differing German and U.S. drafts for SDI.

# Kohl To Send Letter to Reagan

LD111227 Hamburg DPA in German 1139 GMT 11 Mar 86

[Excerpt] Bonn, 11 Mar (DPA) -- Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl is to explain in a letter to U.S. President Ronald Reagan Bonn's ideas concerning the end of negotiations about two framework agreements for cooperation in SDI research projects and the general technology exchanges, it was learned in Bonn today.

Rau also said he missed the government's constructive contributions to the East-West dialogue. "Our current problem is that Bonn has become just a second-class partner in this dialogue -- no more initiatives are emanating from Bonn. We seek to change this." Rau said that a federal government led by him would not conclude an SDI agreement with the United States on the militarization of space: "My objective is to make disarmament possible by means of the policy of detente."

An edited version of the interview was made available to DPA.

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CSO: 5200/2651

## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG: CDU/CSU'S RUEHE ON STATUS OF SDI NEGOTIATIONS

LD121315 Hamburg DPA in Germany 1017 GMT 19 Feb 86

[Excerpts] Bonn, 19 Feb (DPA) -- According to the assessment made by Volker Ruehe, deputy floor leader of the CDU/CSU, an SDI agreement and a government agreement on the general transfer of technology can be concluded between the Federal Republic and the United States before Easter.

Following his return from talks with politicians and scientists in the United States, Ruehe said in a briefing to journalists in Bonn today that there will be two agreements in any event.

Ruehe said that if the drafting of the general agreement on transfer of technology is delayed, one will have to go on with the SDI agreement. There must in no event be delays on the SDI. The general technology negotiations are concerned with establishing general principles and setting up arbitration facilities for disputed cases.

According to Ruehe, the decisive technological hurdles facing a space-based missile defense system have not yet been overcome. The problems of costs for space-based systems are still completely unclear. Most of the research is currently concentrated on land-based developments. Complete defense through the new systems is not possible, in the view of scientists. Scientists are speaking of a level of protection of below 50 percent.

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CSO: 5200/2651

## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG: DER SPIEGEL REPORTS DIFFICULTIES WITH U.S. ON SDI

'Positions Have Hardened'

DW101355 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 10 Mar 86 pp 27-29

[Unattributed article: "All Kinds of Tricks"]

[Text] Helmut Kohl appeared, as always, full of self-confidence and apparently free of any doubt last Thursday when he tried to make the Bonn press believe that everything was okay in talks with the Americans on German participation in SDI. "Negotiations are developing very well," Kohl said. "There will be the framework agreement, as I have announced." After all, relations with the White House "today are as good as they ever were in FRG history."

Only "procedural questions" must be clarified, the chancellery said last week. Between Bonn and Washington there are only "a few open points" which are "not insurmountable."

The opposite is correct. The good-humored man from the Palatinate again misled the public with his fine words. There was great excitement in Kohl's office when Bonn's negotiators returned on the Sunday before last with the bad news from Washington. The participants reported that the negotiations were tough. The Americans were hard and sometimes gruff in their tone. As to the main problem, negotiations will be difficult and preparedness for concessions on both sides is still necessary. Even more so, the Americans showed disappointment from the beginning with Bonn's draft of an SDI agreement, asking whether it would not be easier to cooperate with German firms, without a state agreement.

Indeed, the Bonn negotiators, headed by Lorenz Schomerus of the Economics Ministry, still face difficult obstacles: The American ideas about an SDI agreement with the West Germans contradict Bonn's wishes on all significant points. The chancellor particularly looks like a fool: His "conditions" for an SDI agreement are all being ignored by his American friends.

In the U.S. "star wars" project there cannot be any talk of the "fair partnership" Kohl demanded in his SDI statement on 18 April last year. The U.S. allies also want to hear nothing of services in return for German research work and Bonn's "influence on the whole project" (Kohl). They want to have all the exploitation rights resulting from research orders. Exceptions for foreign contractors are impossible, the Bonn negotiators were told.

The Americans refuse categorically to leave even parts of SDI research entirely to German firms. Commercial exploitation rights for foreign contractors are also not envisaged in the U.S. concept.

The model allies in Bonn should have realized that the Americans do not necessarily pay tribute to the demonstrative loyalty of a vassal. The U.S. Defense Department is pressing for clear political support of the purely military research work on "star wars". It wants the cooperation of the Federal Government in presenting orders to German firms although Bonn rules out state participation. It does not want to make SDI research results available for Western conventional defense or keep the Bonn government informed about the "whole structure" of the SDI project.

Bonn already had to accept that the SDI agreement was not to become a part of the general agreement on scientific-technical cooperation. Economics Minister Martin Bangemann (FDP) tried and failed with that request during his Washington visit in early January. Now, Richard Perle, the Pentagon's assistant secretary of defense, has made it clear again to the Schomerus group that the Americans want two agreements: a "memorandum of understanding" [preceding phrase in English] on German participation in the SDI program and an agreement on technological cooperation problems.

The Americans refuse to overburden the agreement with broadly phrased formulations; they always want to keep things under control; Perle, the hawk, has announced that the United States wants to control German top technology exports to Eastern countries more thoroughly than it is now being done.

A detailed analysis of problems after the return shows the seriousness of the situation: The German negotiators do not rule out the possibility that SDI negotiations could fail.

The Americans do not like it that the FRG, in contrast to Great Britain, has refused to clearly support the SDI project politically. Therefore, they doggedly demand in various details that Bonn commit itself clearly. They reject an agreement merely between individual government departments, they want the Federal Government as a partner.

Since Bonn refused to publicly recognize SDI as a military research program, the negotiators heard strong reproaches; they were told to forget the idea of remodeling the "star wars" program into a commercial enterprise. The U.S. negotiators want to stress the military character. Therefore, they objected when Bonn wanted to smuggle indications of civilian agreements into the memorandum. Instead, they tried with tricks to involve the Federal Government more in the SDI project. In the search for highly qualified German firms they demand official help.

The suggestion to set up a contact office for interested firms in the German Embassy in Washington is not sufficient for the Americans. They press for the establishment of such an office in the Bonn Defense Ministry.

A 5-year cooperation term is too short for them. They would prefer to have no time limit at all. However, the Germans want to commit themselves only for a research phase and not at all to accept commitments for possibly ensuing steps, such as the development and production of space weapons.



Financing problems also exist. Originally the Bonn people believed that they would not have to participate. However, when they read the U.S. counterdraft, the Germans had to realize that respective indirect wishes are hidden in the text. They had no choice but to state repeatedly that the Federal Government cannot take over a central role, let alone a financial one.

The U.S. representatives also did not give in with regard to the problem of exploiting German contribution. According to their opinion, all exploitation rights belong to the U.S. contractor because he is the one who pays. Perle and his aides were not even prepared to pass on future SDI research results for European defense purpose. They made just a general statement: Research results regarding defense against ballistic missiles could contribute to promote defense "against other threats."

The Americans used the opportunity for some intimidation, saying that they could give in on that point if the Federal Government engaged stronger in the SDI program.

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According to the impression of the German group, the positions have hardened: The American preparedness to make concessions is low, while pressure for quick conclusion of the agreement, is great. The explanation is that the U.S. Government does not want to jeopardize its forthcoming talks with Japan and Italy through too many concessions. It fears that otherwise the British could demand changes in their contract.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who will come on 21 March to the FRG to attend the nuclear planning group's meeting, already indicated that he could sign the memorandum of understanding on that occasion. It is clear to Bonn whom Weinberger wants to have as his pet partner: The Federal Government represented by FRG Defense Minister Manfred Woerner.

#### Spokesmen Comment

LD101559 Hamburg DPA in German 1458 GMT 10 Mar 86

[Text] Bonn, 10 Mar (DPA) -- The Federal Government still intends to sign an agreement with the United States on SDI (program of research for space-based missile defense) before Easter. Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost countered reports today (Monday) in Bonn that there are difficulties in the talks with Washington. The negotiations are still under way. The German group of experts will travel again this very week to the United States to coordinate the proposed texts of the agreement.

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## Kohl To Send Letter to Reagan

LD111227 Hamburg DPA in German 1139 GMT 11 Mar 86

[Excerpt] Bonn, 11 Mar (DPA) -- Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl is to explain in a letter to U.S. President Ronald Reagan Bonn's ideas concerning the end of negotiations about two framework agreements for cooperation in SDI research projects and the general technology exchanges, it was learned in Bonn today.

The Federal Economics Ministry has also confirmed that the negotiation delegation led by department chief Lorenz Schomerus will again be visiting Washington tomorrow for several days.

Kohl and Ministers Martin Bangemann (Economy) and Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Foreign Affairs) have mapped out a negotiation course this morning, since difficulties arose at the last round due to U.S. conceptions. The talk was also attended by Kohl's foreign affairs adviser, Horst Teltschik, and Schomerus. Genscher and Defense Minister Manfred Woerner have been asked to contact their U.S. colleagues.

Government circles say that the objective is still to conclude the negotiations before Easter. Bangemann is to sign the agreement for the German side.

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CSO: 5200/2651

## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### CHIRAC OUTLINES SDI STANCE

PM041111 Paris LE MONDE in French 28 Feb 86 pp 1, 9

[Article by RPR Chairman Jacques Chirac: "Building Europe and Common Defense"]

[Excerpts]

This search for a European-style defense together with our partners is bound to increase the efficacy and cohesion of the alliance without changing its objectives. Our allies should make no mistake about this. And that is why the position to be adopted toward the U.S. President's SDI is also important. The Americans have undoubtedly made blunders, be it in the initial presentation of their program or in the rather threatening conditions in which the European countries were asked to take part in it. Of course these blunders had to be pointed out. But it is our fundamental position which counts now. In the midst of conflicting technical information it is probably wise to avoid the naive attitude of saying "science can do anything" and the skepticism of "they will never succeed." Let us admit, for the time being, with reservations, that some elements of terminal defense could probably be deployed in the last few years of this century; and that the means of destroying missiles in the booster phase would probably not be available for approximately 25 years.

This simple timetable shows that the day when the SDI will provide a technical means of replacing "the balance of terror" by "the balance of defense" is distant. Nuclear deterrence will continue to be the very basis of defense for a long time to come. In the next few years it is primarily the political consequences of the SDI which will have to be closely followed.

Indeed the negotiations begun between the two superpowers are bound to include the opportunities provided by technological progress in the processes of balance, intimidation, or arms reduction.

In view of this development, without abandoning our vigilance, there is certainly no point in showing a futile hostility to the SDI, or in preventing our industrialists, should they deem it appropriate, from benefiting from the income and progress they could make by using their know-how in the framework of this program which concerns one of our allies. On the other hand, it is very important for the European countries to maintain and if possible strengthen their cohesion on the conclusions they should jointly draw with regard to European defense. This is an opportunity to introduce a space dimension into European defense, which could immediately comprise the launch of a military observation satellite program. In any case this is vital if only to enable Europe to have direct knowledge of the threats which hang over it, and it is difficult to understand why the SAMRO [military satellite to target ballistic missiles and provide reconnaissance] program which was to follow the SPOT [Satellite Probatoire d'Observation Terrestre -- Exploratory Satellite for Earth Observation] program was not continued after 1981. This European program could also include joint observation of American efforts. Together the European countries would thus define what areas they thought warranted development at the appropriate time.

## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### BRIEFS

TASS CITES JAPAN'S ABE--Tokyo, March 16 TASS--The Japanese Government intends to involve the country into the American "star wars" programme in circumvention of the parliament. This is how observers here assess the latest statement by Japan's Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe during parliamentary hearings that the "government will adopt the important decision, and then inform the parliament." The stance enraged opposition deputies who point out that a parliament resolution bans the use of space research for military purposes. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0901 GMT 16 Mar 86] /9365

QUILES RESPONDS TO SDI CRITICISM--France's participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI]: Whereas the opposition platform proposes reaching "a European position on participation in the SDI," Mr Giscard d'Estaing and Mr Chirac are now clearly backtracking. Like Messrs Debre, Couve de Murville, Messmer, and Barre, now they are not proposing that France should take part in the SDI as such because they now admit that this American plan is not in keeping with Europe's particular security needs. They simply express the wish that French enterprises be able to freely participate in this program. There is no obstacle to that, as I have said publicly on many occasions. As for the search for a common European position on the SDI, I will simply reaffirm that it has already been initiated by the creation of a specific working group within the Western European Union. France played an essential role in that. [Excerpts] [By Defense Minister Paul Quiles] [Paris LE MONDE in French 7 Mar 86 pp 1, 23] /8309

GISCARD D'ESTAING VIEWS SDI--The former head of state thinks that France has failed to find an appropriate reaction to the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] which is the American ABM space defense program. That is why Giscard d'Estaing, considering that Europe is vulnerable to some Soviet weapons (medium-range or short-range missiles and strategic bombers) carrying nuclear charges, proposes the development of ground-based means of interception in the zone which the missiles would enter. He suggests that France initiate a research and test program on means of intercepting weapons targeted on Western Europe. "This program should be drawn up with the countries which have the necessary, in other words, front-ranked technological resources--the FRG, Britain, and Italy. After an initial study it would be appropriate to suggest to the United States that this program be coordinated with the corresponding SDI research phase on an equal footing" in a sphere in which European technology is of a comparable level to American technology. [Excerpts] [Paris LE MONDE in French 18 Feb 86 p 17] /8309

CSO: 5200/2654

## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

### FRG'S KOHL, WOERNER DISCUSS REAGAN COUNTERPROPOSALS

#### Chancellor Welcomes Measures

LD251829 Hamburg DPA in German 1641 GMT 25 Feb 86

[Text] Bonn, 25 Feb (DPA) -- Chancellor Helmut Kohl has welcomed President Reagan's reply to Mikhail Gorbachev's disarmament proposal. Speaking to the CDU/CSU parliamentary group today, the chancellor said that German interests were fully taken into account in the U.S. plan.

Alfred Dregger, chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, said he is of the same opinion. He said that reservations about the first draft letter were removed by the second draft reply. Now talk is not of a differentiated, but of a global zero option solution. This means that the SS-20 missiles in Siberia must also be included in any settlement. Dregger stressed that the Reagan proposals also take into account the short-range missiles.

#### Woerner Assesses Soviet Response

LD260837 Hamburg DPA in German 0404 GMT 26 Feb 86

[Excerpt] Osnabrueck, 26 Feb (DPA) Federal Defense Minister Manfred Woerner (CDU) has expressed the view that the Soviet rejection of the U.S. disarmament proposals is not the Soviet Union's last word.

Woerner said in an interview in NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG (today's edition) that it is an old experience that Moscow always tries at the start of a negotiations process to induce the West to act unilaterally. However, the Soviet Union could not afford simply to sweep the U.S. proposals aside. Woerner said that he sees a realistic chance for a graduated solution on medium-range missiles.

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CSO: 5200/2652

## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

### REPORTAGE ON FRG REACTION TO REAGAN COUNTERPROPOSALS

#### Government Circles

LD231217 Hamburg DPA in German 1150 GMT 23 Feb 86

[Excerpts] Bonn, 23 Feb (DPA) -- U.S. President Ronald Reagan informed Chancellor Helmut Kohl about his reply to the disarmament proposal made by Soviet Communist Party leader Mikhail Gorbachev. It was reported by government circles in Bonn today that a letter on this arrived in the Chancellor's Office yesterday. In it Reagan proposes a graduated plan for the reduction of medium-range missiles by the end of 1989. Informed circles say that the Federal Government was satisfied with Reagan's proposals. German considerations have found their way into the U.S. President's reply to the Kremlin leader.

Juergen Todenhoefer, disarmament spokesman for the CDU/CSU Bundestag group, today sharply criticized the "unilateral zero option solution" proposed by the Americans. The offer is in blunt contradiction to earlier announcements by the U.S. and West European governments and "will clearly weigh heavily on the security of Western Europe and the Federal Republic." The American plan envisages a withdrawal of all Pershing-2 missiles and all American cruise missiles from Western Europe, but allows the Soviet Union to retain half its SS-20's in the Asiatic portion of the USSR. Such an offer by the United States will return to the Soviet Union its "lost monopoly on longer range medium-range missiles," Todenhoefer said.

#### Spokesman Ost Comments

LD241559 Hamburg DPA in German 1430 GMT 24 Feb 86

[Excerpts] Bonn, 24 Feb (DPA) -- In the view of the Federal Government, President Reagan's disarmament proposals are "an important step toward the speedy elimination of all Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles," according to government spokesman Friedhelm Ost. Ost stressed at the same time that Reagan had also addressed the "problem of the conventional forces imbalance, which is particularly important for the Federal Republic."

Among the details of Reagan's letter to Gorbachev which Ost made known today at the federal press conference is the U.S. expectation that there will be rapid progress at the disarmament conferences in Stockholm (CSCE) and Vienna (MBFR).

In the FRG's view, Washington's proposals on medium-range missiles have opened up a "realistic path toward concrete results." Reagan had also included Japan and China in the consultations which preceded these proposals.

For the upcoming medium-range missile negotiations, Bonn considers the following four conditions established by Reagan to be most important:

1. The requirement for equal rights and global limitations;
2. The exclusion of the systems of third countries from U.S.-Soviet agreements;
3. The requirement for simultaneous limitation for medium-range missiles of shorter range [as received]; and
4. The need for effective verification.

#### Genscher Welcomes Move

LD241122 Hamburg DPA in German 1030 GMT 24 Feb 86

[Text] Bonn, 24 Feb (DPA) -- Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher today welcomed the disarmament proposals made by U.S. President Ronald Reagan, which provide for a reduction of medium-range missiles in Europe by 1989. As Lothar Mahling, the FDP spokesman announced, Genscher, at a session of the FDP executive council, referred to the fact that the Federal Government had presented its view on these proposals in a letter from Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and in verbal contacts.

Reagan's reply to the proposal by Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev shows the serious desire of the United States to give new impetus to the East-West negotiations, Genscher said. For the Federal Republic, the question of medium-range missiles is of the greatest importance. Genscher warned against attempts to criticize Reagan's reply before the full text is known.

#### SPD 'Defense Expert'

LD241022 Hamburg DPA in German 0401 GMT 24 Feb 86

[Text] Osnabrueck, 24 Feb (DPA) -- Andreas von Buelow, the defense expert of the SPD Bundestag group, has expressed regret that U.S. President Ronald Reagan did not put forth any more far-reaching proposals in his reply to Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet party leader. In an interview with NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG, published today, Von Buelow says that a reduction of medium-range missiles in Europe is, admittedly, a "good lead-in" to an easing of the rigid positions at the Geneva disarmament negotiations, and he approves of this. But the West still owes Gorbachev an all-round concept by way of reaction to the "very courageous plan" for the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

"Since it is still left open as to how we are going to master these weapons altogether -- and thus the major line of disarmament policy is lacking -- Reagan's answer is not enough," Von Buelow underlined. It is, finally, a matter of being clear about how ready the West is for further nuclear arms reduction, and how in that event the question of conventional stability in this field could be dealt with without a new arms race.

Von Buelow emphatically rejected the comments of CPU Deputies Juergen Todenhoefer and Willy Wimmer who "from a misunderstood idea of security" do not want to dispense with medium-range missiles on German territory directed against the Soviet Union. In view of the U.S. Navy being equipped with cruise missiles throughout the globe, the remaining potential is quite sufficient to ward off the Soviet threat.

"Therefore the belief that the link-up with America is only guaranteed by Pershing-2 and cruise missiles deployed in Europe is very dubious logic," the SPD politician stressed.

The edited interview was released in advance to DPA.

#### CDU/CSU's Dregger

LD241429 Hamburg DPA in German 1054 GMT 24 Feb 86

[Excerpt] Bonn, 24 Feb (DPA) -- CDU/CSU group chairman Alfred Dregger believes that U.S. President Ronald Reagan's reply to the disarmament proposal made by Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev takes proper account of Germany's security interests. Dregger said in Bonn today that the full inclusion of short-range systems, in which the Soviet Union is at present seven times superior, is of decisive importance for the Federal Republic.

Furthermore it is essential that the zero option for medium-range systems also includes the Soviet missiles in the Asian part of the USSR. Dregger said it is reassuring for the Federal Republic to know that the Americans are paying careful attention to German security interests.

Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl received a letter from U.S. President Ronald Reagan on Saturday, in which the latter explained his reply to the Moscow initiative. Details were not released by the German side. Kohl last week emphasized several times that a zero-option for medium-range missiles would have to include also the Soviet systems on the other side of the Urals.

CDU/CSU group deputy chairman Volker Ruehe said today it is above all a success for Kohl in that the U.S. reply contains the demand to include the short-range missiles in the first disarmament phase. Thus new gray areas are being avoided. Ruehe rejected critical remarks by the union's disarmament spokesman, Juergen Todenhoefer, made at the weekend -- which have meanwhile been corrected by the latter -- as "negligent." The "superfluous criticism, some of which was wholly out of the place," of Reagan's proposal revealed that the SPD is out of touch as far as disarmament is concerned.

#### Todenhoefer's Assessment

LD240941 Hamburg DPA in German 0200 GMT 24 Feb 86

[Text] Hamburg, 24 Feb (DPA) -- Juergen Todenhoefer, the disarmament spokesman for the CDU/CSU Bundestag group, today gave a first statement on the letter from U.S. President Ronald Reagan to the Soviet party leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, welcoming the fact that in accordance with the wishes of the CDU/CSU, the U.S. President rejects the original Western thoughts which allowed for proposing a "unilateral zero option solution" to the Soviet Union in the area of medium-range missiles. In a conversation



with DPA, the German press agency, Todenhoefer said that this major course of the U.S. disarmament proposal shows how seriously the U.S. President views German security interests, and how close is the partnership between the U.S. Government and the CDU/CSU.

The originally planned proposal of the West would have eliminated all Pershing-2 and cruise missiles from Western Europe, but would have left the Soviet Union with a mobile "missile deployment unit" with 85 SS-20'S in the Asian part of the country.

Over the past 2 weeks the CDU/CSU came out several times against this originally planned proposal from the West, as it would lead "without doubt to straining Western European security and that of the Federal Republic"...

It is all the more noteworthy that President Reagan reacted so positively to the German misgivings, and in particular to the misgivings of the CDU/CSU, which coincided with the misgivings of France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and also of Japan and other East Asian states.

#### SPD'S Bahr

LD241441 Hamburg DPA in German 1259 GMT 24 Feb 86

[Text] Bonn, 24 Feb (DPA) -- The SPD welcomes the latest disarmament proposals from U.S. President Ronald Reagan and at the same time criticizes the attitude of circles in the CDU/CSU. Egon Bahr, member of the SPD executive council, spoke today of "deception". He said that these circles could not use their "destructive fire" to cause it to be forgotten that Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher had shown readiness for the withdrawal of the U.S. medium-range missiles if the Soviet Union eliminated its own. They are adopting the attitude that the U.S. missiles had "newly become indispensable no matter what the Soviet Union offered."

Bahr stressed that Reagan's reply to the disarmament initiative from the Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev offered Europe "the only opportunity to be rid of all Soviet medium-range missiles, and also the U.S. missiles counterdeployed against them." Horst Ehmke, deputy SPD Bundestag group chairman, welcomed the fact that Reagan had contributed to "movement in the right direction." It is alarming that the "concrete heads" in the CDU/CSU are stabbing the government in the back, Ehmke said. Juergen Todenhoefer, the CDU disarmament expert, Alfred Dregger, the group leader; and Willy Wimmer, the defense politician, are compromising the chancellor and the foreign minister, who had agreed to Reagan's plan.

#### 24 Feb Press Review

DW241320 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0605 GMT 24 Feb 86

[From the Press Review]

[Text] Editorials today deal with President Reagan's answer to General Secretary Gorbachev's disarmament proposal.

Bonn's GENERAL-ANZEIGER writes: The U.S. and Soviet proposals on medium-range missiles show some important differences: Reagan does not feel responsible for a freezing of British and French weapons, something Gorbachev has demanded. With the exception of a small number, Reagan wants the Soviets to withdraw their missiles, including those from Asia. The obstacles are great, but it should not be impossible to overcome them. Remarkable, the possibility of a real, first disarmament phase again came a good deal closer to reality this weekend. In this connection it is important for the partners of the United States that Reagan offered to withdraw the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles from Western Europe parallel to Moscow's withdrawal of SS-20 missiles, but only after thorough talks with the allied countries. In the consultations it became clearer than ever to the Americans that Europe not only longs for disarmament, but that it is simultaneously afraid to be left alone without nuclear weapons.

KIELER NACHRICHTEN notes: At first glance President Reagan's response to Soviet party chief Gorbachev's proposal seem to be different only regarding the schedule: The Kremlin chief wants the medium-range missiles to be removed from Europe in 5-8 years, while Reagan is pressing for a shorter period. However, the value of their exchange of letters does not lie in details. They will be the subject of a sharp dispute. It is most important that in an East-West dialogue the proposal of one side is not simply discarded with a "nyet" or a "no." Reagan consulted the Western allies prior to writing his answer. They reacted positively, supporting the U.S. President's course of action in handling the disarmament problem with greater flexibility than before.

NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG maintains: Washington hopes to achieve a great arms control policy breakthrough in Geneva to come from a first partial solution involving medium-range missiles in Europe. The only people in the FRG who can be happy about a complete withdrawal of U.S. missiles and the simultaneous thinning-out or removal of SS-20 missiles to Asia are those who equate the mere presence or absence of missiles with the presence or absence of the danger of war. Such a view disregards an important reason for Western counterarmament, aside from just reacting to the Soviet armament lead -- an even closer linkage of European security to the United States. In addition, new medium-range missiles are deployed in the immediate vicinity of the inner-German frontier, which makes it easy for the Soviets with such additional potential to abstain from the heavy SS-20 missiles.

#### 25 Feb Press Review

DW251055 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0605 GMT 25 Feb 86

[From the Press Review]

[Text] One of the editorial topics today is again U.S. President Reagan's recent disarmament proposals.

Discussing the superpowers' disarmament dialogue, which has entered a new round through the recent initiative of President Reagan, the Duesseldorf RHEINISCHE POST writes: No doubt the proposal by Soviet party chief Gorbachev in mid-January to eliminate all nuclear missiles before 2000 has created some temporary embarrassment for the West. The Moscow general secretary is leading in the propaganda race. However, the West, which does not speak with one voice like the Kremlin hierarchy, has now caught up with President Reagan's answer, which was highly welcomed by Bonn. It is not at all just a matter of winning over the opinion of the people, but of introducing real, although long-term, disarmament steps. In this sense the zero option solution phrase is gaining sudden currency.

Freiburg's BADISCHE ZEITUNG notes: It must be positively assessed that Reagan did not listen to those wanting to slow him down. Rejecting efforts to achieve a zero option solution would have dealt a hard blow to the NATO alliance's credibility in the eyes of Westerners; those who believe that consideration of such connections is opportunism have a strange approach to democracy. A stable guarantee for U.S. involvement is the permanent presence of 300,000 U.S. soldiers in the FRG, not the overloading of our continent with further nuclear weapons of dubious quality and deterrent effect, states the newspaper.

NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG maintains: It is rather baffling with what sharpness Moscow has rejected President Reagan's disarmament proposals. If one assesses the proposals soberly, one cannot but call them a harmonious extrapolation of General Secretary Gorbachev's concepts. He wants to eliminate all nuclear weapons by 2000. At first glance the Soviets may consider Reagan's idea to deploy their SS-20 missiles in such a way that they can reach neither Europe nor Japan as an unreasonable request. What would be the good of such missiles then? However, the other side of the coin is that the United States concedes to the other side a certain number of such weapons, while it is prepared to accept a zero option in Western Europe. Seen that way, Moscow's rejection is rather of a propagandistic nature, which most likely must be seen in connection with the 27th CPSU Congress opening today.

#### DIE WELT Editorial

DW251139 Bonn DIE WELT in German 25 Feb 86 p 2

[Editorial by Cay Graf Brockdorff: "The Counteroffer"]

[Text] It is too early to make a final judgment about Ronald Reagan's arms control offer. The text of his proposals is not known. With this reservation one can say that it seems that the objections of the allies, not least of Japan, to the "modified zero option solution" have had an effect on Washington. However, it remains to be seen whether all the current jubilation is justified.

The discussion of the missiles issue was mainly emotional. It obscured the fact that arms control does not have value in itself; it serves as a security policy function. The slogan "create peace with fewer weapons" is no substitute for a policy that pursues peace and security.

The report that Washington wants to implement the dismantling of medium-range missiles only proportionally to Soviet reductions is reassuring. However, the information that the Soviet Union will be permitted to keep a certain number of SS-20 missiles in Central Asia is disturbing. They are mobile and can be quickly relocated. The relocation of U.S. systems in Europe would presuppose a complicated political consultation process.

The inclusion of short-range systems in Reagan's offer is of fundamental significance for Europeans: If these systems remained deployed, untouched by disarmament measures, the Soviet Union could threaten Western Europe, and especially the FRG, without having to fear a counterblow to its territory. It also contains the danger that Moscow could retain a limited number of SS-20 missiles somewhere. The Kremlin has always planned to downgrade Western Europe to a strategically second-class area while declaring itself a first-class state in need of protection. It remains to be seen whether the acclamation should not possibly be somewhat toned down when all the strategic implications are understood fully.

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CSO: 5200/2652

## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

### FRG OFFICIALS, PRESS COMMENT ON GORBACHEV SPEECH

Minister Moellemann

LD252113 Hamburg DPA in German 1751 GMT 25 Feb 86

[Text] Bonn, 25 Feb (DPA) -- The Federal Government has welcomed the rejection by Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev of a striving for military supremacy. In an initial response, Juergen Moellemann (FDP), minister of state in the Foreign Ministry, said this evening that Bonn too believes that security can only be achieved through constructive dialogue and political means. On the other hand, Moellemann criticized the fact that Gorbachev had called into question the planned summit meeting with President Reagan. Moellemann urged the Soviet Union to go ahead with the meeting and to reach concrete disarmament agreements with the United States.

Politicians Comment

LD262023 Hamburg DPA in German 1536 GMT 26 Feb 86

[Text] Bonn, 26 Feb (DPA) -- Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost has said the Federal Government will carefully examine and analyze the speech by Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the CPSU congress. Ost told journalists in Bonn today that a conclusive statement at the present time would be premature, if only from the point of view of the extent of the speech, which lasted several hours.

However, Ost did refer briefly to Gorbachev's remarks on President Reagan's counter-proposals on the elimination of medium-range nuclear weapons. Concerning Gorbachev's statement that the U.S. proposals contained "all sorts of clauses," Ost said in the opinion of the Federal Government these conditions contained Western security interests and indispensable negotiating positions. For his part, Gorbachev had set a number of linked conditions.

The Federal Government thought it necessary that the summit planned for this year must yield substantive progress, but this need not be restricted exclusively to the sphere of security policy and arms control. It is important that the spirit of Geneva, which Gorbachev also invoked several times, be applied in practice. It is less a matter of words than of deeds.

Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said at a party meeting in Wuppertal today that Gorbachev depicted the West in a "grossly distorted mirror." These ideological attacks are usual in party congress speeches. Gorbachev also listed important principles for cooperation, Genscher said. Genscher said he believes the speech also made clear the "great efforts" that Moscow must make to achieve an economic upswing and which would not be assisted by an arms race.

In an interview in Thursday's edition of BJLD, CDU/CSU Bundestag group deputy chairman Volker Ruehe said with regard to the Western proposal for a zero option solution for medium-range missiles that this would not be the Soviets' final word. Anyone, like Gorbachev, who wants to eliminate all the world's nuclear weapons by the year 2000 would destroy his credibility if he was not even prepared to remove completely a single nuclear weapons system -- the medium-range missiles -- by negotiations.

Ruehe said he is confident that this year there will be a second Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting which will produce concrete results.

He welcomed Gorbachev's proposal for the solution of question of family reunification and marriages in a humane and positive spirit. It is hoped that through this the scope for the GDR will become greater.

According to the Greens in the Bundestag, Gorbachev's speech contained "very constructive and useful proposals". The Soviet side have now set out a catalogue of offers "not only for putting a brake on the existing arms buildup but also to really achieve effective and worldwide disarmament." Bundestag party spokespersons Annemarie Borgmann, Hannegret Hoenes, and Ludger Volmer assessed the stress on international reunification of families and the emphasis on social and personal human rights as important humanitarian and political signals. What matters, however, is what practical measures will follow these announcements.

#### Press Review

DW261350 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0605 GMT 26 Feb 86

[From the Press Review]

[Text] Editorials today deal extensively with the 27th CPSU Congress in Moscow.

DIE WELT writes: The usual lengthy, progress report which was rapidly read by Mikhail Gorbachev, contains some puzzling aspects. Certain formulations cannot be ignored. For example, he mentions that neither one state alone, nor a group of states, can solve current world problems, adding that, therefore, a new interpretation of the term peaceful coexistence is necessary. In the next breath, however, the general secretary uses all the terms from the Soviet Communist ideological arsenal that make trusting cooperation with the noncommunist world appear to be impossible. He speaks of the U.S. imperialists, who are divided by an abyss from the rest of humanity. He professes solidarity with world liberation movements and revolutions. If he takes that seriously, confrontations with the Americans are unavoidable, concludes the newspaper.

KOELNISCHE RUNDSCHAU notes: President Reagan was scolded by international opinion, not just by the Soviet Union, when he called the Soviet leadership the incarnation of evil. That was justified. What the general secretary said yesterday at the Moscow party congress about the United States can likewise be called just primitive agitation. When Gorbachev tells his delegates that everything democratic is hated by the United States, it is either unbelievably stupid or mean, or may be both. What he has said about disarmament is worthy of attention and respect. However, such concepts become credible only if one knows something about the spirit that inspired such concepts, if one knows the climate in which one wants to achieve such an important aim as disarmament.

NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG stresses: The general secretary appeared as the new strong man, full of self-confidence and action, a renewer of the country, and a persistent advocate of Soviet interests. One can safely assume that there is a skillful double strategy behind his appearance. The massive criticism of economic stagnation and the demand for radical reforms may have shocked the 5,000 delegates, who also stood accused. The sharp reaction to the U.S. disarmament proposals, going as far as threatening to call off the second summit meeting, which does not fit at all into the soft talk of Geneva, could help to reunify. Attacks on an outside adversary is still a tested means of integration when domestic political problems must be solved. Therefore, the West must not take the harsh rejection of Reagan's proposals as the Kremlin chief's last word.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE maintains: His party congress speech indicates how much Gorbachev longs for a better Soviet economy. He said that a thorough change in the economy through radical reforms is necessary. How is that to be achieved? Greater investment is supposed to lift the economy to a new technical level. However, how will it be achieved if all the money and all the technology falls into the old productivity hole? Obviously, Gorbachev still has no idea how to avoid it. He speaks of more independence for plants, but at the same time he says that central planning must work more effectively. The more effectively it works, the less the plants have to decide upon. Where is the money for investments to come from? If Gorbachev says that a modern and more productive economy will produce it, he is selling the milk of a cow he has not yet bought. If the general secretary does not want to push the people back into bitter poverty, he has to cut down on armaments, states the newspaper.

BRAUNSCHWEIGER ZEITUNG notes: After all, the CPSU congress could have served Gorbachev to indicate substantially the direction in which he wanted to go. Accusations of predecessors and criticism of all the obvious shortcomings belong to the routine of Communist daily life, but they are not very suitable to thoroughly change life's gray reality. Basic and thorough reforms, which alone can promise change, are obviously not on Gorbachev's agenda or he does not yet feel strong enough to mention them. In foreign policy, too, he seems still to be sticking to the Kremlin line of depicting Western states as dying monsters without, however, being able to renounce cooperation with them, cooperation that is of vital importance for the East bloc. So there is nothing new. One can only hope that this is not Russia's last resort, because it would be disappointing, writes the newspaper.

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CSO: 5200-2652

## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

### FRG FOREIGN MINISTRY ON ALLIED NUCLEAR RESPONSE

LD181652 Hamburg DPA in German 1546 GMT 18 Feb 86

[Text] (?Bonn), 18 Feb (DPA) -- The West German Foreign Ministry spoke this afternoon on the subject of a report that there was no joint action on the part of the three countries, Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic. Juergen Chrobog, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, stated that accordingly there could not be any conditions jointly made either.

The consultations among the allies on a Western response to the Gorbachev proposal have been conducted hitherto within the NATO framework in Brussels and with American special envoy Paul Nitze. The joint response would result from these, it was said by the Foreign Ministry.

Bonn government circles pointed emphatically to the reasons for the deployment of the Pershing-2 missiles and the cruise missiles. They had always been regarded as a response to the Soviet prior arming of SS-20 missiles. If these SS-20 missiles could be "negotiated away," then the need for the Western counterarmament would disappear, without any further conditions.

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CSO: 5200/2652

## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

### FRG'S GENSCHER, NITZE DISCUSS DISARMAMENT ISSUES

#### 'Intensive Exchange' of Views

LD071730 Hamburg DPA in German 1603 GMT 7 Feb 86

[Excerpt] Bonn, 7 Feb (DPA) -- Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher received today Paul Nitze, the U.S. disarmament expert, for consultations on disarmament problems. In an intensive exchange of views the special adviser on disarmament questions to the U.S. secretary of state informed the federal foreign minister about the U.S. preparation of a response to Moscow's proposal. Nitze, one of the most experienced U.S. disarmament experts, will discuss the details tomorrow with Friedrich Ruth, the German disarmament representative.

Genscher has already stressed repeatedly over the past few weeks Germany's interest in a withdrawal of intermediate-range missiles by both sides. The Soviet general secretary has proposed such a withdrawal as a step on the way to the total elimination of all nuclear arms by the year 2000.

#### Further Report

LD071936 Hamburg DPA in German 1815 GMT 7 Feb 86

[Text] Bonn, 7 Feb (DPA) -- Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) today received Paul Nitze, the special adviser on disarmament questions to the U.S. secretary of state, for talks at some length in Bonn. The main subject was an agreement among the United States, Bonn, and the other allies in Europe, on a joint response to the disarmament proposal by Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet party leader.

According to the Foreign Ministry, during the talks Genscher welcomed the U.S. Government's intensive efforts for consultations with its allies toward reach an alliance position on this matter. Genscher and Nitze had agreed that arms control, directed at dependable war prevention, must encompass the whole relationship of military powers. In a phase of intensified efforts toward drastic reductions of nuclear weapons, the negotiations in Vienna, Stockholm, and Geneva took on special significance. Only through parallel progress in all fields could lasting stability be achieved, which would preclude the risk both of nuclear and conventional war.

There were officially as yet no hint as to how the government in Washington would react to Gorbachev's proposal, which put forward the elimination of all atomic weapons by the year 2000. According to American newspaper reports, U.S. President Ronald Reagan is, however, ready to give a positive answer.

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CSO: 5200/2632



## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

### FRG'S GENSCHER, TODENHOEFFER ON GORBACHEV PROPOSAL

LD081431 Hamburg DPA in German 1353 TMT 8 Feb 86

[Text] Bonn, 8 Feb (DPA) -- Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher believes that the disarmament proposal of the Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev could make an interim agreement possible in efforts to reduce intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. After his talks with Paul Nitze, the special adviser on disarmament questions to the U.S. secretary of state, Genscher said in an interview on Southwest German Radio on Saturday that such an interim agreement would be more important for the Germans than anyone else. Germany was not only threatened by Soviet SS-20 missiles, but also serves as the deployment country for U.S. missiles.

In Genscher's view, a new quality in the disarmament talks between the Americans and Soviets had become apparent. It was of decisive importance for the West to examine the proposal in detail and to avoid, in contrast to previous occasions, dismissing the Soviet proposal from the outset as a propaganda move.

The disarmament spokesman of the CDU/CSU group, Juergen Todenhoefer, has on the occasion of Nitze's visit welcomed the close consultations held by President Reagan and the Federal Republic above all on the issue of intermediate-range missiles. They demonstrated the U.S. desire to respond to Gorbachev's proposal in conjunction with its allies rather than on its own in this central issue.

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CSO: 5200/2632

## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

### KVITSINSKIY EXPLAINS GORBACHEV PROPOSAL TO FRG

#### Meets With Genscher

LD221541 Hamburg DPA in German 1516 GMT 22 Jan 86

[Excerpt] Bonn, 22 Jan (DPA) -- The Federal Government intends to contribute to ensuring that the opportunities contained in the new Soviet disarmament proposal are carefully examined and actively used. Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher stated this to Yuliy Kvitsinskiy, Soviet negotiator at the Geneva disarmament negotiations in Bonn today. The new starting points in the Soviet proposal ought to be appropriate for providing movement on the different levels of negotiations. The Federal Government hopes for "substantial progress" at the Geneva, Vienna, and Stockholm talks.

At Moscow's instigation, Kvitsinskiy informed the Federal Government on the position of the Geneva negotiations. On this point he particularly explained party chief Mikhail Gorbachev's new proposal according to which all nuclear weapons are to be eliminated within the next 15 years. A Foreign Ministry spokesman said that Kvitsinskiy had provided "very interesting information." The Soviet diplomat also met Federal Government disarmament representative Friedrich Ruth and the chancellor's foreign policy adviser, Horst Teltschik. He plans to brief SPD Chairman Willy Brandt on Thursday.

#### Comments on Geneva Talks

DW230917 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1800 GMT 22 Jan 86

[Interview with Yuliy Kvitsinskiy, USSR negotiator at the Geneva disarmament negotiations, with unidentified correspondent in the "Heute" news program on 22 January in Bonn -- recorded]

[Text] [Question] Ambassador Kvitsinskiy, are you content with the German reaction to Mikhail Gorbachev's disarmament proposal?

[Kvitsinskiy] We had a good talks with Mr Teltschik. The reaction of the Federal Government is at present formulated only in a temporary way. However, it recognizes positive points, acceptable points, in our initiative. The study of our proposal continues. I believe that the potential is there to activate our offers, the mutual offers, to resolve the central problems of safeguarding peace and the further development of cooperation.

[Question] Can negotiation success be achieved in Geneva quickly?

[Kvitsinskiy] In Geneva, naturally, the prerequisites exist objectively to negotiate quickly and achieve results. However, it does not depend only on us.

[Question] What did you tell the German side about a possible participation in SDI?

[Kvitsinskiy] We explained to the German side that participation in that program would have negative consequences.

[Question] Of what kind?

[Kvitsinskiy] The destabilizing effects of the program for the strategic balance are clear and one should avoid those destabilizing effects.

#### Meets Brandt, Other SPD Officials

LD231557 Hamburg DPA in German 1525 GMT 23 Jan 86

[Text] Bonn, 23 Jan (DPA) -- The Soviet negotiator at the Geneva disarmament talks, Yuliy Kvitsinskiy, briefed the SPD leadership on the disarmament proposal of party leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Bonn on Thursday. According to an SPD spokesman, Kvitsinskiy told SPD leader Willy Brandt that this proposal represented a step-by-step plan for the complete removal of nuclear weapons, which is intended to take into account the security interests of both sides at every stage. In the development of weapons systems, it was necessary to think and act with those prospects in mind.

In further talks with the SPD politicians Egon Bahr, Horst Ehmke, and Karsten Voigt, a number of individual points were discussed, among them conventional armed forces. The SPD saw these talks as positive and expressed the hope that the Western side was now working on a "constructive answer" to the Soviet proposals.

Brandt and other SPD politicians also intend to meet the chief American negotiator, Max Kampelman, in Bonn on Friday.

#### Talks With CDU/CSU's Ruehe

LD241242 Hamburg DPA in German 1020 GMT 24 Jan 86

[Text] Bonn, 24 Jan (DPA) -- In the opinion of Volker Ruehe, deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party, the latest disarmament proposal by Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev represents an all-out attack on the U.S. SDI research project for a missile defense system in space. In a preliminary detailed assessment, Ruehe, speaking to newsmen in Bonn today, acknowledged that there were constructive as well as problematical elements in Gorbachev's call for disarmament of all nuclear systems and for arms limitation measures for conventional and chemical weapons. It was now a matter of separating the chaff of propaganda from the wheat of genuine negotiating substance.

Ruehe suggested linking the disarmament concepts of the Americans and the Soviets together and making the degree of implementation of defensive systems dependent on the offensive weapon potential then available. The Soviet negotiator at the Geneva disarmament negotiations, Yuliy Kvitsinskiy, with whom Ruehe discussed these matters yesterday, insisted however on the Moscow position of making the coming into force of disarmament measures in other areas dependent on agreements on SDI. Ruehe also has a meeting today with U.S. negotiator Max Kampelman.

Ruehe said that the Soviet Union was primarily interested in influencing the forming of Western public opinion. The West must be allowed Moscow's thesis that nuclear weapons were immoral while conventional weapons were highly moral to prevail. The Soviet Union must not be allowed to convey the impression that it was opposed to the West and in favor of nuclear systems. The fact was that the West supported a zero solution guaranteed by defense systems and verification, while the zero solution offered by Moscow was intended to ensure Soviet supremacy.

Ruehe believed that Gorbachev's proposal could be seen as a "basis for discussion," but Moscow must define in detail the "very generally phrased proposal."

He said it was constructive that Moscow was no longer blocking progress in the INF [intermediate-range nuclear force] negotiations with the demand for inclusion of the third-state [nuclear] potential of Britain and France. However, the precondition for this was Western renunciation of SDI, of the modernization of British and French nuclear weapons and of the possibility of an INF interim solution.

The Soviet readiness to name production plants for chemical weapons to enable verified destruction met an important Western demand. The threefold precondition for disarmament readiness was, however, a hardening of the Soviet position. Ruehe made a strong plea for the use of all disarmament levels and called for the "achieving of large goals by means of realistic small steps." Political confidence-building between East and West was necessary for this.

Ruehe refused to compare the Gorbachev proposal with the Stalin note of 1952, but said that the comparison was interesting. Clearly, a fresh legend of a missed disarmament opportunity was to be built up. But the Stalin note had not been a real offer for the reunification of Germany and thus not a missed opportunity, but rather an attempt by Moscow to prevent the Federal Republic's attachment to the West.

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CSO: 5200/2632

## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

### USSR'S KVITSINSKIY, FRG'S GENSCHER DISCUSS DISARMAMENT

LD220820 Hamburg DPA in German 0708 GMT 22 Jan 86

[Text] Bonn, 22 Jan (DPA) -- Yuliy Kvitsinskiy, the Soviet negotiator at the Geneva disarmament negotiations, met with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher for a discussion in Bonn this morning. The government is awaiting further information from Kvitsinskiy on the latest Soviet disarmament proposal, according to which all nuclear weapons would be eliminated in the next 15 years.

The Soviet diplomat will then also talk with Ambassador Friedrich Ruth, the FRG's disarmament representative, and Horst Teltschik, the chancellor's foreign policy adviser.

On Friday, the American chief negotiator in Geneva, Max Kampelman, will come to Bonn to brief the government on the disarmament negotiations from Washington's viewpoint.

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CSO: 5200/2632

## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

### FRG PAPER CALLS U.S. MISSILES ESSENTIAL TO WESTERN SECURITY

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 21 Feb 86 p 1

[Editorial by Christoph Bertram: "Playing With Hopes: Missile Compromise a Long Way Off"]

[Text] If Mikhail Gorbachov had had any say in the Kremlin 5 years ago, there probably would never have been such a thing as Western counterarming. A few weeks ago he proposed what the West had asked for long ago: the destruction of all Soviet medium-range weapons in Central Europe, if the West would dismantle the Pershing and cruise missiles. The null solution, then proposed by the West and continuously rejected by the East, has been resurrected.

Whenever the Soviet statesman comes up with an initiative, his U.S. counterpart wants to do likewise. During the next few days, just in time for the CPSU party conference, Ronald Reagan will no doubt pick up on the Soviet proposal. After all, the two already conceived an interim solution for the medium-range missiles at the Geneva summit. Could it be that there will be a breakthrough in the bogged-down disarmament front in Europe?

Two things militate against this. For one thing, both sides have tied their respective null solutions to conditions which would be difficult to fulfill. Gorbachov demands that the nuclear dwarfs, France and Great Britain, would have to renounce the long planned expansion of their arsenals to enable the nuclear giants to reach agreement; Paris and London have rejected this unequivocally. In addition, he wants the United States to renege on furnishing strategic submarine missiles to Britain; Reagan has already rejected that. On the other side, Washington wants to see the number of Soviet SS-20 missiles in Asia cut in half; the Soviets refuse.

Something else is even more important. The Euro-missiles are primarily bargaining chips for the USSR and the United States in the big game with the other superpower. By demonstrating a willingness to make limited concessions, Gorbachov tries to get closer to the main Soviet target, to check the SDI plans of his U.S. rival. He has realized since the Geneva summit, if not before, that this cannot be brought about by a frontal assault, but perhaps through some tactical detours. Ronald Reagan too is pursuing a mainly tactical objective. He feels pressure from the allies and from public opinion at home

to come up with concrete solutions at the next summit. In such an accomplishment, the null solution is meant to assist him in signaling his readiness to negotiate while at the same time leaving his pet project, the SDI, intact.

Thus the superpowers are not looking for a solution for Europe, but for themselves. This is not necessarily a disadvantage for Europe. However, the Europeans must ask themselves whether the wrangling over a null solution enhances their security and, at the same time, disarmament. The answer to this is more difficult than it is believed to be by those who remember nothing beyond yesterday's catch phrases.

To be sure, the null solution was invented in Bonn when anxieties over counter-arming were at their peak, and was gradually accepted in the Western alliance. But it was never based on any strategic wisdom; merely on political opportunism. Anyone who wants to see West European security guaranteed not by superiority in war, but rather by deterrence--nothing else is conceivable in the nuclear era--would basically welcome the presence of modern, mobile and non-provocative U.S. missiles in Europe. This would apply to the slow cruise missiles, but not to the 14-minute weapon Pershing II. The close tie-in of our survival with that of the United States would become obvious to one and all in this manner. The null solution would contribute nothing to our security, if the European peace of the last 40 years can serve as proof for anything at all.

The governments should have learned from the counterarming debate that in the long run opportunism in security policy is a bad guideline. If they did not learn this at the time, Gorbachov is spelling it out for them today. The fact that the superpowers are feeling their way toward regulating the medium-range weapons is to be welcomed--providing that the nuclear backup for European security is maintained. For this reason, neither Gorbackov's null solution nor Reagan's missile defense are in the European interest. This must now be made plain. There will be no real progress in Geneva until such time as the United States puts the brakes on its Star Wars ambitions and the Soviets include their heavy intercontinental missiles in the negotiations. Anything else would be nothing but preliminary skirmishes, but no solution--not even for Europe.

9273/13045

CSO: 5200/2649

## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

### FRG DISARMAMENT REPRESENTATIVE IN MOSCOW FOR TALKS

LD101039 Hamburg DPA in German 1002 GMT 10 Mar 86

[Text] Bonn, 10 Mar (DPA) -- The Federal Government's disarmament representative, Ambassador Friedrich Ruth, traveled to Moscow today (Monday) for 2 days of consultations. According to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Ruth will meet with Deputy USSR Foreign Affairs Minister Viktor Kompletkov, among others.

The consultations in Moscow are part of the Federal Government's arms control policy dialogue conducted with the Warsaw Pact member states.

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CSO: 5200/2652



## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

DREGGER: ZERO OPTION PRACTICAL ONLY ON A GLOBAL BASIS

Bonn DIE WELT in German 20 Feb 86 p 10

[Interview with Alfred Dregger, chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary fraction by Manfred Schell; date and place not given]

[Text] Alfred Dregger, the chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary fraction, has joined the debate concerning the planned American response to the Gorbachev proposals by issuing an urgent appeal. Only if all the Soviet medium-range systems are removed, Dregger told DIE WELT, could American medium-range systems be withdrawn from Western Europe. Dregger was interviewed by Manfred Schell.

[Question] There is a great deal of speculation with regard to the negotiating positions currently being considered in Washington for the East-West disarmament talks...

[Answer] There are no firm positions as yet; but they are coming up. For a country without nuclear weapons and located at the East-West interface in the heart of Europe like the FRG these are life-and-death questions.

[Question] Is a differentiated zero option being considered with regard to medium-range nuclear missiles ?

[Answer] If there is to be a zero option for medium-range nuclear missiles, it should be total and unlimited. If all the American Pershing 2s and cruise missiles are to be withdrawn, then all the comparable Soviet medium-range missiles must be removed as well. It would be unacceptable to grant them a privileged sanctuary in Eastern Siberia. The SS 20s are mobile. They could very quickly be moved from Eastern Siberia westward to new positions from which they could pose a threat to all of Europe.

Since the FRG has waived the right to possession of its own nuclear weapons and has assigned its nuclear protection on a trusteeship basis to the United States (which no one should forget), the FRG would be nuclear-free in a sense if the American Pershing 2s and cruise missiles were withdrawn but would in no way be free of the nuclear threat. On the contrary: the threat posed by Soviet nuclear weapons as a consequence of the absence of a counterweight would only grow larger.

[Question] From a military strategy point of view, what would the removal of all the Pershing 2s and cruise missiles mean to the FRG's security ?

[Answer] The presence of American nuclear weapons on German soil tells a Soviet Union bent on expansion that it would not only have to contend with German and other NATO forces on our territory but also with the United States, a world power, and all its military resources including nuclear weapons. That is best protection a medium-sized power in an exposed position could expect to have. At the same time, the stationing of American nuclear weapons on German soil means that the United States is pledging its own survival, its own cities in guaranteeing our security, since any war in Europe would inevitably spread to the United States.

The risk to the United States would be reduced if all the Pershing 2s and cruise missiles were withdrawn from German soil and the German risk would increase accordingly, since such a move would weaken the link between the American medium-range missiles and the strategic systems in the United States. This would be all the more serious for the FRG in view of the fact that France and Great Britain continue to refuse to station any nuclear weapons of theirs on German soil and to share the risk connected with such a policy.

In addition, there is the exceptional threat to the FRG in particular posed by the short-range and shorter-range medium-range Soviet systems (the SS 21s, 22s and 23s) where the Soviet Union enjoys a 7:1 advantage.

The bottom line would be that the FRG, which does not have nuclear weapons of its own like France or Great Britain, would be totally exposed to the threat potential of all the Soviet short-range systems as well as the SS 20 medium-range systems which could be moved westward from Eastern Siberia within a matter of days, if it were no longer protected by nuclear weapons stationed on its soil.

In my opinion, the American medium-range systems could only be withdrawn from Western Europe, if all Soviet medium-range systems would disappear. In addition, there is an urgent need to make short-range and shorter-range medium-range systems part of any solution in order to establish balance at a lower level.

[Question] What position do you think the other powers affected by a graduated zero option might take ?

[Answer] France and Great Britain will not accept any superpower dictate regarding the size of their nuclear arsenal. Japan, which is threatened by the medium-range missiles stationed in Eastern Siberia in particular but also non-nuclear nations of Western Europe such as Holland are unlikely to be enthusiastic about such a solution. All nations have a right to equal

security. The Soviet Union is neither politically, nor morally justified to exert pressure on its neighbors by means of an immense potential for their annihilation.

So the bottom line is: if there is to be a zero option, then it must be total, i.e. the short-range and medium-range systems must be scrapped altogether. The same applies to chemical weapons. The intercontinental strategic systems of the United States and the Soviet Union should be reduced to reasonable levels which might result in France and Great Britain agreeing on limitations on their own national nuclear arsenals. As part of a disarmament process, which we welcome in principle, the FRG and the other non-nuclear nations of Western Europe must not be transformed into a zone of diminished security. Due to their exposed position they must enjoy the same protection as their allies whose nuclear weapons are stationed on their soil.

9478

CSO: 5200/2642

## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

### DANISH SDP'S LASSE BUDTZ ON GENEVA TALKS, SDI, TEST HALT

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 24 Feb 86 p 29

[Op Ed Article by Lasse Budtz, Social Democratic Party foreign policy spokesman]

[Text] There is some basis for new positive developments in East-West arms reduction negotiations in several areas. Some restrained optimism can even be detected in NATO. But having said that it should be added immediately that there are some serious and very big obstacles that must be overcome before concrete results can be achieved. But both sides, including the American president, are willing to enter into constructive negotiations with regard to these problems.

That was the impression left by a number of talks and briefing sessions in which a group of western politicians (the undersigned represented Denmark) engaged in Geneva and Brussels. It would be wrong and improper to quote directly from these meetings. But there can be no doubt about the quality of the information we were given, as it came from the highest ranking participants in the direct negotiations and our briefing sessions were held with the negotiating delegations in Geneva and with NATO's highest officials in Brussels. It should be added that we encountered an attractive openness and a willingness to discuss matters at all our meetings.

What follows is an attempt to indicate the state of affairs with regard to the most important arms control areas in line with the way the negotiations are going at this time.

#### Removing the Missiles

European medium-range missiles: Premier Gorbachev's plan for a gradual elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000 also contains a proposal to reduce the medium-range missiles that have led to so much uneasiness and anxiety in Europe as part of the first phase. It is true that negotiations are currently under way on removing a sizable number of these missiles and perhaps all of them. Both sides have proposed a zero solution. But the Soviet proposal does not contain a satisfactory reduction of missiles in Asia, although they would like to remove all those in Europe, we were told.

British and French nuclear weapons would be frozen in the first phase and the United States would be barred from providing a third country (such as England) with new weapons. The United States cannot accept these last three conditions for total disarmament, but negotiations are continuing anyway, partly because the Soviet Union is no longer making a reduction of European medium-range missiles dependent on a halt to the Star Wars program. This is a positive development.

By and large U.S. allies share the position of the United States. Japan also wants to have Asian missiles removed, the British and French do not want to have their weapons dismantled and Holland cannot really understand what is going on after finally approving deployment in that country in the face of tremendous difficulties.

NATO military people appear to be more than skeptical. A zero solution would just bring us back to 1979, they say. A zero solution would cancel out a "flexible response" (a varied reaction to attack) to some extent and destroy the vital military "linkage" between the United States and Europe, they add. If this attitude gains the upper hand a reduction to a smaller number of missiles is possible. The number could be cut to 140 or even less. But there is a positive development and it is worth noting. And even the Kohl government in Bonn would like to get rid of all missiles.

#### Star Wars

Space weapons and strategic long-range missiles are the two other areas on which the Soviet Union and the United States are negotiating bilaterally and the two areas are closely connected. Only very limited progress can be detected here, but a dialogue has been started. In reality the Soviet Union no longer opposes research in principle, but the Russians do oppose specific research pertaining to space weapons and their production and deployment. And the Soviet Union will not reduce its own long-range strategic missiles unless development of these weapons is halted.

That is undoubtedly the last point to be agreed on--if that ever happens. If no agreement is reached we can count on the development of a Soviet Star Wars program, the production of more long-range missiles and the deployment of several submarines armed with missiles along U.S. coastlines. There is some disagreement about which weapons are involved in the negotiations. The development is extremely dangerous as far as the Soviet economy is concerned, but the Americans have nothing against producing this kind of side effect, of course.

#### Fewer Weapons

Reduction of conventional weapons is the topic of a special conference in Vienna--now in its 14th year--and here a trial agreement is being arrived at that is less ambitious than the original goals but that could turn out to be very significant. The idea is that the United States will withdraw 5,000 soldiers from central Europe and the Soviets will withdraw 11,500. The Soviet Union would withdraw more men because it is closer to central Europe and can

therefore pull its troops out more quickly. Military experts have a hard time concealing their skepticism and civilian negotiators say that the problem lies in inspection. Can one be sure that troops are being withdrawn? Negotiations are under way on setting up control posts--but the main thing is that positive negotiations are being conducted.

### Chemical Weapons

The problem of chemical weapons has becoming increasingly urgent and there are talks about this problem at the big United Nations arms reduction conference in Geneva as well as in direct negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The problem is that the Soviet Union has very big stockpiles of chemical weapons in Europe. The West has only small amounts and some of them are outdated and the United States stopped production of these weapons years ago. Congress has permitted new production, partly because of enormous military pressure. But there are problems of what to do with these weapons. One model calls for keeping chemical weapons that are produced in the United States. Another calls for moving only a few to Europe during peacetime.

NATO says--following the lead of the United States--that global solutions are needed (zones are not popular, in other words), but that controls under an agreement to reduce or eliminate chemical weapons would be almost impossible. There is still a desire to continue negotiations. But--it is said--new production is necessary, because otherwise we could not force the Russians, who have an advantage in this area, to negotiate seriously. And if we have some chemical weapons we will maintain a "flexible response" in this area too--and chemical weapons might lead to the avoidance of nuclear weapons. That is like choosing between the plague and cholera. It is an important point, of course, that it may be hard to find any West European nation willing to accept chemical weapons on any terms.

### Test Ban

Many people, though not the Americans, feel that a nuclear test ban agreement is the most important goal of all. The American position is based primarily on the argument that an agreement could not be checked (although some agree unofficially that this is not true), that the old weapons must be tested now and then, that nuclear weapons will be used in the Star Wars program (they are now saying this openly) and finally that they simply feel a need to develop new nuclear weapons because the Russians are so strong in the area of conventional weapons. There is an entirely new but not unattractive frankness here. The generals are in agreement but many members of Congress have strong disagreements. They want a nuclear test ban now. Immediately.

In the course of our orientation trip we ran into two other problems that could put a serious strain on western cooperation. Some Europeans think that the European NATO countries should launch their own Star Wars program. And some Americans think West Europeans should help pay for the U.S. Star Wars program.

Try carrying these ideas to their logical conclusion. It does not require much imagination to conjure up the political uproar the proposals could lead to if a serious attempt was made to carry them out.

6578

CSO: 5200/2647

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### USSR: EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS IGNORE POPULAR OPINION ON MISSILES

LD122129 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 12 Mar 86

[Commentary by Aleksandr Zhelkver]

[Text] The trial on the action of the Netherlands defenders of peace against the government which has agreed to the deployment of U.S. nuclear missiles has begun in The Hague. Here is a comment by our political observer Aleksandr Zholkver who is at the microphone.

The trial in the Netherlands capital is notable in many respects. First and foremost, it clearly refutes the assertion that the antimissile movement has decreased and the West Europeans are almost welcoming the deployment of U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles in their countries. The judicial action against the Netherlands Government was signed by about 20,000 people, and the total number of signatures against the existence of U.S. nuclear missiles in the country is 4 million. That number is equivalent to the majority of adults in the country's population. The situation is similar in other Western European countries.

In the FRG, the leadership of the Social Democratic Party has called for taking an active part in the spring peace marches which will proceed under the motto: Pershings out. In Britain, there is no end to protest demonstrations at the U.S. military bases where cruise missiles are deployed. Many Western European observers stress that the new rise in the antiwar movement is connected with the fact that a realistic prospect for ridding the European continent of the explosives has appeared (?for people).

Such a prospect was opened by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement of 15 January which was again confirmed at the 27th CPSU Congress.

As is well known, concrete proposals for both the elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in the European zone and other aspects of security in Europe including a reduction of conventional armaments and measures to strengthen mutual trust and control have been set forth there. At present, eminent political figures in Western Europe, the West German Social Democrats again as well as the British Labour Party and Liberals are calling upon their governments not to miss this indeed historic chance to support and respond to the Soviet initiatives with their own proposals and at least not to object to arms reduction, as they at present do in London and Bonn, where reservations of all kinds against disarmament are set forth. At the same time, the attachment of these countries to the U.S. "starwars" plans is being strengthened.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the Political Report of the Central Committee to the congress stressed that it is the European aspect that the CPSU considers to be fundamental in its international activity. Our country is for Europe advancing toward a more settled stage of detente, toward the creation of reliable security.

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CSO: 5200/1293

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### PAPER ANALYZES REAGAN'S EUROMISSILE PROPOSAL

PM261511 Paris LE MONDE in French 25 Feb 86 p 1

[Editorial: "Euromissiles: Mr Reagan's 'Yes, but'"]

[Text] In the great pingpong match on disarmament revived by the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in November and the Soviet plan of 15 January, propaganda considerations and opportunities for publicity are never forgotten. It is probably no coincidence that the U.S. President chose to reply to his Moscow's counterpart's proposals on the very eve of the start of the 27th CPSU Congress --the regime's "high mass" and an occasion for speeches portrayed as spectacular.

While awaiting the publication of Mr Reagan's letter, which is said to be long and detailed, one hesitates to regard as definitive the first--and so far the only--reaction recorded in Moscow--that of a Soviet television commentator who thinks the American position "contains virtually nothing constructive." In view of the importance which the new team in Moscow attaches to the revival of the negotiations, it seems more probably that Mr Gorbachev will show interest in some aspects of the American proposals and will show his readiness to continue the dialogue.

The substance of Mr Reagan's reply--the elimination of the intermediate-range missiles in Europe and Asia, which the U.S. President proposes to carry out in 3 years--is not surprising. As Mr Nitze, his adviser, explained to the U.S. European allies at the beginning of this month, Washington considers the part of the Soviet plan devoted to the intermediate-range nuclear forces, in other words, the Euromissiles as the most promising: not only because of the much broader basic concessions made by Moscow in this sphere, but also because Mr Gorbachev is no longer insisting on linking this aspect to that of space defense. It is therefore on European armaments that Mr Reagan has the most chance of finding an area of agreement with the Kremlin and, consequently, of holding the second summit he wants this year.

His reply is therefore essentially positive, but it is still accompanied by two objections, or additions which are not unexpected either. First, Washington rules out the idea of the French and British forces forming the subject of a deal at any level, even regarding their current modernization plans.



Paris and London had already been very clear on this point, and if the American negotiators had any other ideas in mind, they were forced to abandon them.

The other objective relates to the situation in Asia, and it is perhaps on this point that the American position has had to change most under pressure from its allies or friends. Not only Japan, but apparently also Australia and even China insisted that the Soviet SS-20 missiles targeted on the Far East should be very limited. Mr Reagan is apparently now offering Mr Gorbachev a choice between various solutions, notably the complete liquidation of this arsenal, or the possibility of the United States responding to it by deploying an equivalent arsenal in Asia.

One swallow does not make a summer, but it seems that on this occasion the U.S. allies have forced Mr Reagan to adopt a firmer line than he originally intended to adopt. It is true that Washington did not have much choice in view of the interests of unity in his camp and of detente with Moscow.

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CSO: 5200/2653

## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### SOVIET COMMENTS ON LATEST ROUND OF STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

USSR Delegate Grinevskiy

LD141020 Moscow TASS in English 1015 GMT 14 Mar 86

[Text] Stockholm March 14 TASS -- The latest session of the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe has closed in the Swedish capital today.

Summing up the results of the latest round of the talks, the leader of the Soviet delegation, Oleg Grinevskiy, said that some progress had been made thanks to the efforts of socialist, neutral and non-aligned states and that a number of formulae on the non-use of force, notification of major military exercises, invitation of observers, etc. had been produced. However, he stressed, the USA and its closest NATO allies keep avoiding a search for solutions to major unresolved problems at the conference and do not show readiness for businesslike and serious negotiations. As a consequence, business at the conference is making an inadmissibly slowly progress. Agreement has so far been reached mostly on peripheral questions but the negotiating machinery is often running idle.

'U.S. Marking Time'

LD140842 Moscow TASS in English 0809 GMT 14 Mar 86

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS -- "At the Soviet-American summit in Geneva, the leaders of the two countries voiced their intention to contribute jointly with the other states participating in the Stockholm Conference to its early and successful completion," Mikhail Kostikov says in PRAVDA. "The joint Soviet-American statement says that the sides reiterated the need to adopt at the conference a document which would include both mutually acceptable confidence formalization of the principle of the non-use of force. That was in Geneva, however, but the situation in Stockholm, regrettably, is different. The U.S. delegation is still trying at the negotiating table to avoid tackling the substance of the question by invoking hardly relevant stipulations from the U.N. Charter and the Helsinki Final Act."

"Compared with a complex of broad political and military confidence building measures formulated by the delegations of socialist countries, the NATO package of proposals

looks meagre and obviously inadequate," the journalist says. "It takes a glaringly narrow approach to military technical matters and constitutes an attempt to secure unilateral advantage by all means.

"It is also symptomatic that as the Stockholm forum proceeds, the socialist countries have more than once supplemented and concretized their proposals. The same can be said of the group of neutral and non-aligned countries, which are contributing to the approximation of the positions of East and West. Contrary to that, the NATO package remains unchanged. It seems to be frozen and actually to exude a cold breath. It is only the tactics that is varied: While at the outset the opponents of accords flatly rejected the proposals of the socialist countries, now they tend to resort to procrastination and propagandizing.

"...The USA and its NATO allies are just marking time in Stockholm," the correspondent stresses. "The peoples of Europe cannot approve of such an approach."

#### PRAVDA Correspondent

PM151721 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Mar 86 First Edition p 4

[Text] Stockholm, 14 Mar -- The latest session of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is drawing to a close in the Swedish capital. It has taken place in the conditions of an active peace offensive by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. The 15 January 1986 statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, a number of whose provisions are directly relevant to the confidence and among other things to the disentangling of unresolved problems, the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th CPSU Congress and the idea that it puts forward of creating an all-embracing system of international security -- all this has been at the center of the forum participants' attention. After all, a significant proportion of the new Soviet initiatives relate directly to Europe.

The participants in the Stockholm forum -- that offspring of the all-European process that began in Helsinki -- are called upon to erect lasting barriers to close every opportunity for the use of force and for covert preparations for war and to ensure the growth of mutual trust. These aims are served by the package of large-scale complementary confidence and security building measures put forward at the conference by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

Among these measures, special significance is attached to the "Basic Principles of a Treaty on the Mutual Nonuse of Military Force and on Maintaining Relations of Peace," submitted by the Soviet delegation. This document focuses attention on the most important thing -- the need to adopt a commitment not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional arms against each other, and thus not to use military force against each other at all.

Despite the prolonged opposition of the delegations of the United States and a number of its NATO allies, the discussion of this proposal became one of the main components of the Stockholm forum. An important role was played in this by the position

of the neutral and nonaligned countries. Their draft document notes, in particular: The states participating in the Helsinki process will refrain in their mutual relations and in international relations in general from use of force -- direct or indirect -- and will adhere strictly and effectively to the principle of nonuse of force as a law of international life. Representatives of certain NATO countries spoke in the same vein, and insisted that the principle should be made more concrete and extended, while the representative of Cyprus, on the instructions of the group of neutral and nonaligned countries, submitted a proposal for the adoption of a declaration of a politically binding nature banning the use of force in any form.

In the course of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva, as is known, the two countries' leaders expressed the intention, together with the other states participating in the Stockholm conference, of promoting its speediest successful completion. As is enshrined in the joint Soviet-American statement, the two sides reaffirmed the need to adopt a document both incorporating mutually acceptable confidence and security building measures and giving concrete form and effectiveness to the principle of the nonuse of force. That is how things were in Geneva. Unfortunately, things are different now in Stockholm. At the conference table, the American delegation is still seeking to avoid the crux of this question. It makes farfetched references to the UN Charter and the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Or else it tries to substitute purely military-technical measures for the resolution of this question.

But one thing is no substitute for the other. Military confidence-building measures are directly dependent on and interconnected with political measures, that is, on the adoption of commitments not to use force. In this sphere too major issues are at stake. They include the limitation of the scale of military exercises, preliminary notification of major exercises of ground, naval, and air forces and troop movements and shipments, the inviting of observers, and a number of other measures. The socialist countries' proposals in this sphere take into account to a great extent the position of other states, including the neutral and nonaligned states.

Against the background of the range of large-scale political and military confidence-building measures formulated by the socialist countries' delegations, the NATO package of proposals looks meager and frankly inadequate. It is a question of an extremely narrow approach to military-technical questions and an attempt to secure unilateral advantages, using all kinds of truths and untruths.

Many of the so-called proposals of the United States and the NATO countries are no more than half-measures. Others only create an appearance. Both are directly contrary, by their nature, to the conference's mandate, which provides for equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, and identical respect for the security interests of all the participating states.

The following fact is noteworthy in the Stockholm forum's work. Throughout its course the socialist countries' proposals have been added to and made more concrete many times. The same is true of the participation of the group of neutral and non-aligned countries. They promoted a rapprochement in the positions of East and West. The NATO package on the other hand, remains unchanged. It is frozen, so to speak, and it really exudes cold. Only the tactics change: From the initial frank rejection of the socialist countries' proposals, the opponents of an agreement are going over to various kinds of procrastination and propaganda tricks.

The failure to resolve the question of notification about major exercises of ground forces, fleets, and air forces is also seriously retarding the attainment of concrete accords at the conference. The USSR has proposed that this problem be resolved, if not comprehensively, then piece by piece. Agreement could be reached now on notifications of major ground and air force exercises. The question of naval activity could be carried over to the next stage of the conference. This practical approach was greeted with satisfaction by the majority of participants.

As for the United States and a number of its allies, their verbal show of "constructiveness" conceals a stubborn reluctance to move at all. There is evidence of a desire to change nothing in their own position, and even to harden it. And to present the Soviet proposals in a false light. Evidence of this is provided by a public statement by R. Barry, head of the U.S. delegation, who not only tried to misrepresent the essence of the USSR's proposals, but also attempted to convince his listeners that the results of the conference will be based wholly on the NATO package.

The conference has now embarked on work to draw up the formulations and individual provisions of the concluding document. This work is taking place in five working groups with the help of coordinators from the neutral and nonaligned countries. Here the U.S. delegation's obstructionist approach is again making itself felt. The coordinator's very first attempt to bring the sides' positions closer together confirmed this. The United States and some of its allies are still not ready seriously to set about resolving the main tasks of the Stockholm conference. This is indicated by the principle of their participation in the activity of the working groups. Previously, for more than 6 months they were submitting their proposals for examination by the conference piece by piece. Then they stuck them together as some kind of "package" and ceremoniously publicized them as a single document. Now they are cutting it up into pieces again and presenting them for discussion by the working groups, with no changes at all.

All the same, it is possible today to speak of some progress at the conference. The first formulations for possible inclusion in the draft concluding document have been laid down. But these -- it must be said frankly -- relate only to secondary issues and do not touch on the crux of the problems.

... The United States and its NATO allies are dragging out the time in Stockholm. The peoples of Europe cannot agree to such an approach. They expect concrete, large-scale measures from the conference toward confidence and security building and disarmament. Time will not wait. The end of the present stage -- 19 September -- is not far off.

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CSO: 5200/1295

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: PACT COUNTRIES SUBMIT DRAFT AGREEMENT AT MBFR TALKS

LD141737 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1545 GMT 14 Mar 86

[Announcer-read report from "The World Today" program presented by Aleksander Zholkver]

[Text] In examining problems of disarmament, some Western politicians state that one should not reduce the problem to one of atomic weapons alone, for conventional arms are not less dangerous. Here is a report on the talks at which this problem is being discussed:

For 12 years now, in Vienna, representatives of 19 central European states have been examining the question of mutual cuts in armed forces and armaments in this region. I have often been in the Vienna Hofburg Palace where the talks are being held. It was hard to establish any progress there.

But now the Warsaw Pact countries have made an attempt to get things moving. They submitted a draft agreement envisaging that in the course of a year the USSR and the United States will withdraw 11,500 and 6,500 servicemen from central Europe respectively, together with military hardware. The remaining participants in the talks would pledge not to increase for at least 3 years the personnel and armaments of their land forces and air forces in central Europe.

At a regular plenary session of the Vienna talks, the head of the USSR delegation proposed starting on the joint elaboration of the text of such an agreement.

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CSO: 5200/1295

## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### USSR'S MIKHAYLOV CALLS FOR AGREEMENT AT VIENNA TALKS

LD131336 Moscow TASS in English 1321 GMT 13 Mar 86

[Text] Vienna March 13 TASS - Ambassador Valerian Mikhaylov, the leader of the Soviet delegation, who addressed the plenary meeting of the Vienna talks today, dwelt specifically on the socialist countries' proposal to get down jointly to drawing up the text of an agreement. He declined as biased the assertions of the West that the draft accord tabled by the Warsaw Treaty countries on February 20 this year on the initial reductions by the Soviet Union and the USA of their land troops and armaments with the subsequent non-increase in the levels of the armed forces and armaments of the sides in Central Europe "is not an adequate reply" to "the far-reaching Western proposal of December 5, 1985."

The ambassador demonstrated that it was the draft of the socialist countries that ensured a sensible, balanced and realistic basis enabling the sides to reach accord both on the substance of the main contents of the agreement and on measures of the sensible verification of compliance with it without prejudice to the security interests of any of the partners in the talks.

The question thus boils down anew to whether the NATO countries are prepared really to seek accord on the basis of mutually acceptable compromise. They do not so far show readiness to do so. Moreover, there is an obvious contradiction between the statements made by Western representatives before we tabled our draft agreement on February 20 and the proposal to get down jointly to writing the text of an agreement, on the one hand, and what we hear now, on the other.

A strange metamorphosis is happening to the statements of the West and its present-day action. The representatives of the NATO countries rose up in arms against both the draft agreement and the proposals of the Warsaw Treaty countries to get down jointly to writing the text of an agreement. This reaction is all the more difficult to understand since our detailed draft agreement, if one takes an unbiased approach to it, really constitutes a new and substantial step towards bringing closer the positions of the sides. It contains additional constructive elements which were absent from the proposal made by the socialist countries in February last year and takes account of those elements of the Western position which seem acceptable to us. It also offers compromise solutions on a number of important aspects where differences between the sides are especially considerable, including questions of verification.

Mikhaylov stressed that the draft of the socialist countries broadened the practical possibility to reach accord and provided proper conditions for starting joint work to

draft the text of an agreement. This work could help formalize in legal and contractual formulae those aspects in the positions of the sides which are identical, to finalize individual stipulations, articles and elements, that is, to make headway more purposefully. Those points and questions which cannot be settled on a mutually acceptable basis could for the time being be sidelined.

This joint work, we think, would not be confined to a formal comparison of the positions of the sides. It could help to break them down into details and to look for possible mutually acceptable solutions.

The leader of the Soviet delegation pointed out the arbitrarily inflated and unrealistic character of the Western demands on the system of control and verification and noted that the West for its part had not only failed to introduce any constructive changes in its stand on verification since 1979 but, conversely, had even toughened it.

This does not testify to the flexibility or willingness of the Western participants to look in practice for mutually acceptable solutions at the talks. He urged the West to assume a realistic and businesslike stand which could make it possible to reach a mutually acceptable agreement in Vienna.

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CSO: 5200/1295



## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### USSR'S ISRAELYAN STATEMENT AT GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALKS

LD131203 Moscow TASS in English 1155 GMT 13 Mar 86

[Text] Geneva March 13 TASS -- The Soviet Union will work perseveringly to assert the principle of peaceful co-existence in inter-state relations and act as a vigorous advocate of the implementation of the programme for eliminating completely weapons of mass annihilation by the end of the current century, said Viktor Israelyan. The head of the U.S.S.R. delegation spoke today at the plenary session of the disarmament conference. In our day, when the task of creating a comprehensive system of international security is as acute as never before, the Soviet Union proposes the fundamental principles of such a system, which are fair and take into account the interests of all states. They include, among others:

- Renunciation by the nuclear powers of war -- both nuclear and conventional -- against each other or against third countries;
- Prevention of an arms race in outer space, cessation of all nuclear weapons tests and the total destruction of such weapons, a ban on and the destruction of chemical weapons, and renunciation of the development of other means of mass annihilation;
- A strictly controlled lowering of the levels of military capabilities of countries to limits of reasonable adequacy;
- Disbandment of military alliances, and as a stage towards this - renunciation of their enlargement and of the formation of new ones;
- Balanced and commensurate reduction of military budgets.

The refusal to take the reasonable approach suggested by the U.S.S.R. threatens with further scaling up of the nuclear arms race and its spread to outer space, which in the longer term will bring about only increased tension, fear and mistrust in inter-state relations, will replace strategic stability with strategic chaos and will augment dangers a multiple times. The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, if implemented, will result in this, Israelyan said.

The representative of the USSR noted the tremendous importance for mankind's vital activity of the peaceful exploration of outer space, in particular, by means of satellites of a variety of purpose. The studies of the Halley's Comet, which were success-

fully conducted under the "Vega" project, can serve as an example of productive cooperation among many countries in this field.

Considering the fact that some countries are not prepared at present to solve the problem of preventing the arms race in outer space in its entirety, the Soviet Union now proposes taking partial measures which build up trust in the field of space activity, namely, to conclude an international agreement on ensuring the immunity of space objects. Such an agreement would meet the interests of all countries and be a major step towards banning completely the use of force in outer space and from outer space with regard to earth, a step from "star wars" to "star peace", Israelyan said.

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CSO: 5200/1295

## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### FRG SPD SPOKESMAN CRITICIZES WEST'S MBFR POSITION

LD041156 Hamburg DPA In German 0938 GMT 4 Feb 86

[Text] Bonn, 4 Feb (DPA) -- The SPD on Tuesday called on the Federal Government for greater initiatives concerning the Vienna troop reduction negotiations (MBFR).

In a parliamentary question by the SPD group, dealt with at a meeting of the lower house, the Federal Republic's prime interest in these negotiations was pointed out. The disarmament spokesman Hermann Scheer, speaking at a press conference, accused the West of having neglected the MBFR talks which have been conducted for 13 years. The last Western proposal for a European troop reduction by 5,000 U.S. and 11,500 Soviet soldiers was "of pathetically paltry."

Scheer complained above all that the West had ignored the positive points of the Gorbachev proposal, and continued to stick to its own insufficient proposals which failed to take into account the Soviet initiative. Now was the time to include weapon reductions as well in the negotiation list. In this the MBFR forum was especially suitable to become a motive force in achieving a breakthrough in conventional arms reduction. However, Bonn had no concept of these disarmament negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the only ones in which the Federal Republic was taking an active part. In order to activate interest the SPD called for a foreign minister conference of the MBFR member states.

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CSO: 5200/2632

## BRIEFS

POLISH CDE AMBASSADOR ON MILITARY OBSERVERS--The Polish initiative concerning military observers, presented at the Stockholm Conference, has been the subject of a press conference. Ambassador Wlodzimierz Konarski, head of our delegation, stressed that the Polish initiative concerns a group of military and political problems linked to the introduction of a compulsory system of inviting observers in Europe to exercises and troop movements, which is very difficult to resolve. The favorable reception of the Polish proposals, Ambassador Konarski said, indicates that that part of the problem which they concern may be resolved more quickly than was foreseen. [Text] [Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1830 GMT 12 Feb 86 LD] /7358

CSO: 5200/3025

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### PRAVDA OBSERVER ON SOVIET POSITION ON TEST BAN

PM161701 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Mar 86 First Edition p 4

[Boris Orekhov "International Review"]

[Excerpts] The significance, for instance, of a Soviet initiative like the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions is clear to any unprejudiced person. Let us recall that the moratorium went into effect on 6 August last year. Guided by the interests of peace, the Soviet Union extended the term of the moratorium, which expired 31 December last year, for a further 3 months, once again proposing that the United States join in this initiative.

Recently, while the Soviet moratorium is still in effect, the leaders of six countries-- Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania -- have appealed to the USSR and U.S. leaders to refrain from nuclear tests until the holding of the planned summit meeting, and have offered to give assistance in observing seismic activity in the region of tests.

The appeal of the six was greeted with approval by sober-minded Western politicians. Even in Washington a large group of congressmen came out in support of it. The opinion of these legislators is based on the support of millions of American citizens who have launched a nationwide campaign with the aim of making the administration join in the cessation of nuclear explosions.

As for the Soviet Union's position, its consistency and peaceful thrust were once again confirmed in the response to the appeal from the six state leaders which M.S. Gorbachev gave on behalf of the Soviet leadership. The Soviet Union stated that it will not carry out nuclear explosions even after 31 March -- until the first nuclear explosion in the United States.

The Soviet response contains a proposal to the American side to reach agreement on granting the opportunity for observers from both sides, on a reciprocal basis and following appropriate requests, to visit the sites of obscure phenomena so as to remove any possible doubts as to whether such phenomena are associated with nuclear explosions.

In order to fully solve the problem of tests, what is needed is a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests on an international legal basis. The USSR proposes setting about elaborating such a treaty without delay and resuming or commencing relevant talks in any form -- bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral, without linking this to other issues.

The Soviet leadership's businesslike and concrete response to the appeal by the six countries' leaders is eloquent evidence that the USSR is doing, and will continue to do, everything necessary to transfer the resolution of the urgent problem of ending nuclear tests onto a practical footing and to achieve the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. Aware of its responsibility for the peoples' fate, the Soviet Union will persistently implement its peace program, which has become a beacon of hope for mankind.

But how is the United States behaving? Finding itself in a difficult position, the Washington Administration is trying to extricate itself, resorting to maneuvers and subterfuge. What else could you call President Reagan's statement, issued by the White House, setting forth the supposedly "new" U.S. proposal? It is clear from news agency reports that the President is offering the Soviet side only the discussion of the technical problems of "verification" ["proverka"] of the Soviet-U.S. treaties that were concluded in 1974 and 1976 and have not yet been ratified, through the fault of the American side. The ratification of these treaties, which should have taken place long ago, is now being made dependent on the results of such a discussion.

Moreover, it is proposed that the Soviet Union send scientists to observe the American nuclear weapon tests planned for the 3d week in April. Thus once again, instead of stopping nuclear explosions, as mankind demands, they are proposing the observation of the carrying out of such explosions. The Soviet Union has already expressed its view on this: We are in favor of monitoring [kontrol] the end of nuclear explosions, but we are against continuing tests in the presence of observers as a substitute for ending them.

Concerning Reagan's "proposal," THE NEW YORK TIMES writes: "This seems to be an attempt to divert criticism by Congress and certain foreign capitals of the fact that the U.S. Administration has ignored the Soviet proposals on ending underground nuclear tests."

Yes, this is clearly a base ploy.

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CSO: 5200/1294

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA CARRIES TEST BAN APPEAL, GORBACHEV ANSWER

### Six Leaders' Message

PM131935 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Mar 86 First Edition p 4

[Text] To Mr M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

Esteemed General Secretary!

The world welcomed your summit meeting with President Reagan last year and the confirmation of your resolve to achieve the speediest results at the talks on nuclear and space arms. We, however, are concerned that so far no agreement has been reached concerning specific measures "preventing the arms race in space and halting it on earth." This task is of paramount importance for the future of mankind, when the very survival of our planet is at stake. As long as nuclear weapons exist, there can be no security in the world. We are all living in the face of the terrifying possibility of our death in a nuclear conflagration, whether as a result of an accident or of evil design. That is why we feel a sense of duty to do everything possible to avert this threat and to create a new concept of world security without nuclear weapons.

The next summit meeting between you and President Reagan, which is expected this year, will, in our opinion, be a decisive opportunity for you both to agree on specific steps to halt the nuclear arms race.

We believe that we must encourage everything which could be done to create trust and a positive atmosphere for achieving such accords at your summit meeting. One such confidence-building measure would be for both your countries to refrain from any nuclear tests in the period through the next summit meeting. This could open the way to an agreement mutual moratorium on nuclear blasts with the appropriate verification [proverka]. This would also facilitate talks on a treaty on a universal ban on tests.

We urge you not to sanction any nuclear tests in the forthcoming months prior to the summit meeting. We are convinced that this would be interpreted throughout the world as evidence that at this meeting you are both prepared to draw practical conclusions from your joint statement in Geneva that "nuclear war must never be unleashed and there can be no victors in it."

We renew our proposal to render assistance to the verification [proverka] of any suspension of nuclear tests and to eliminate doubts regarding its fulfillment and possible violations. This assistance could include on-site inspection [inspektsia] and observation measures on your territory and in our countries.

You bear the main responsibility for ensuring our common survival. People throughout the world support any step which you take to bring us closer to the goal of liberating earth from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely,

Raul Alfonsin, Argentina  
Miguel de la Madrid, Mexico  
Olof Palme, Sweden  
Rajiv Gandhi, India  
Julius Nyerere, Tanzania  
Andreas Papandreu, Greece, 28 February 1986

#### Gorbachev Response

PM131757 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Mar 86 First Edition p 1

["The Reply from M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the Joint Message from the Leaders of Argentina, India, Mexico, Tanzania, Sweden, and Greece" -- PRAVDA headline]

[Text] To Mr Raul Alfonsin, president of Argentina, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, prime minister of India, Mr Miguel de la Madrid, president of Mexico, Mr Julius Nyerere, president of Tanzania, Mr Ingvar Carlsson, prime minister of Sweden, Mr Andreas Papandreu, prime minister of Greece:

It grieves me profoundly to say that Olof Palme, felled by the villainous hand of a lowly assassin, is no longer among you. His tragic death rankles in the hearts of all those who cherish peace, for the preservation of which he was campaigning impassionately and tirelessly.

Esteemed Messrs,

On behalf of the Soviet leadership, I want to express to you our sentiments of profound respect for the consistency and purposefulness that are characteristic of your efforts to have the arms race ended and to avert nuclear war. In our view, your promotion of joint initiatives meets in full measure the task of organizing constructive and positive interaction of states and peoples on a worldwide scale, especially now that the very fate of the human race is hanging in the balance.

Ideas of universal security without nuclear weapons, voiced in your letter, are quite consistent with the concept of the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security put forward by us at the recent 27th CPSU Congress. One of the fundamental principles of such a system should be the complete and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons, and we are unanimous with you in this respect.

I think that our viewpoints also coincide in that the ending of nuclear tests can and must become an important step on the path towards ridding mankind of the nuclear arms race, with all its pernicious consequences.

Obviously, it is no chance that you are raising this question anew today, not long before the expiration of the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions.



The extra time we granted the U.S. Administration to weigh our proposals is running out. We cannot extend it unilaterally forever. Having refrained from all nuclear explosions, both test and peaceful, for over seven months now, we have already paid a certain price both militarily and economically.

At the same time, in response to your appeal to the Soviet Union and the United States not to conduct any nuclear explosions until the next Soviet-American summit meeting, we state: The Soviet Union shall not conduct nuclear explosions after March 31 either -- until the United States carries out its first nuclear explosion.

As for the problem of verification [kontrol], I would like to stress anew that we attach much importance to it because we have an interest in accords being strictly honored and in all the participants being completely certain of the fact.

As regards a nuclear test ban, verification [kontrol] can be ensured by national technical means and also with the help of international procedures -- including on-site inspections [inspektsiya na mestakh] if need be. We offer the U.S. side to reach agreement on possibilities for observers from both sides to visit sites where questioned phenomena occur on request and on a reciprocal basis to remove possible doubts about whether such phenomena are related to nuclear explosions.

We are willing to accept your proposal -- naturally, if it is accepted by the other side, too -- of assistance in verification [proverka] of the halting of nuclear tests, including on-site inspections [inspektsii na mestakh].

Naturally, a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests on the basis of international law is needed fully to resolve the problem of testing. We suggest that work be started to draw up such a treaty without delay and that appropriate talks in any form -- bilateral, tripartite or multilateral, moreover without linkage to any other questions -- be resumed or started. And we offer those who fear that questions of verification [kontrol] may be pushed into the background at such talks to engage simultaneously in resolving these questions, too, from the outset of such talks so as to have a comprehensive accord as soon as possible.

I can assure you that the Soviet Union for its part will continue to do everything necessary to put the solution of the urgent problem of ending nuclear tests onto practical tracks and to secure the complete elimination of the nuclear arms arsenals.

With respect,

M. Gorbachev

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CSO: 5200/1294

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: REAGAN SAYS TEST BAN PROPOSAL 'UNJUST TO U.S.'

LD132035 Moscow TASS in English 2017 GMT 13 Mar 86

[Text] Washington March 13 TASS -- In an interview with the newspaper BALTIMORE SUN President Reagan again turned down the appeals of the Soviet Union, as well as of leaders of Argentina, India, Mexico, Tanzania, Sweden and Greece to stop all the nuclear explosions and immediately start talks on concluding a treaty on the all-embracing banning of nuclear tests.

According to Reagan, this proposal is "unjust towards the U.S." which allegedly lags behind in modernization and the creation of new nuclear weapon systems. He also mentioned verification difficulties. The President's statements are at variance with the reality. This was pointed out by American specialists on more than one occasion. Thus, the influential Defense Information Centre cited the data showing that the U.S. had staged more nuclear tests than the Soviet Union which has been observing unilaterally a moratorium on nuclear explosions since August 6, 1985. BALTIMORE SUN wrote recently that on the whole the number of nuclear tests staged by the U.S. was greater by one third than the corresponding figure for the Soviet Union.

As for the President's statement about difficulties with the verification of the moratorium on nuclear tests, it is emphasized again in the answer of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev to the leaders of six countries that the Soviet Union is ready for the creation of a proper verification system, including on-site inspection.

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CSO: 5200/1294

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### IZVESTIYA COMMENTS ON REAGAN LETTER ON TEST BAN

PM141353 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Mar 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Yu. Bandura "International Commentary": "Washington's Nuclear Challenge; About R. Reagan's Letter to the U.S. Congress"]

[Text] In a letter sent to the U.S. Senate on 12 March, U.S. President R. Reagan confirmed the Washington administration's position on the question of a full and universal ban on nuclear tests.

Neither the introduction of a moratorium on nuclear blasts nor the ratification of the treaty on limiting underground nuclear weapons tests (signed in 1974) and the treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (signed in 1976) "accord with the interests of the United States and its allies."

This message needs no extensive interpretation. Its thrust comes down to one thing: Washington intends to continue its nuclear explosions. And consequently to continue the arms race on its most dangerous salient.

To judge from the content of the message reported by REUTER, the U.S. President put forward many "arguments" to justify this stance. But they did not include one that was not already known to the international public and has not been rejected by it as unsound.

The reference to Washington's "concern" over the problem of verification [kontrol] of explosions is also unsound. It was confirmed from the platform of the 27th CPSU Congress that the Soviet Union is open to verification and we are no less interested than others in it.

The reference to "the Soviet Union's violations of the treaties" is unsound: This "argument," repeatedly exposed as artificial and without any foundation by the Soviet side, is essentially being used by Washington to deliberately thwart the talks and to reject all existing arms limitation agreements.

The reference to "the absence of a constructive response from Moscow" to his (Reagan's -- Yu.B.) overtures to hold discussions on these problems is unsound: The White House is suggesting that we attend U.S. explosions whereas our aim is the total and universal cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

The reference to the "nonconformance" of the halting of nuclear tests with the interests of the United States and its allies is also unsound. Answering a TASS correspondent's questions in August last year, M.S. Gorbachev stressed: "The question arises: what is it here that does not accord with the interests of the United States and the American people? This path is unsuitable only for those who are gambling on strong-arm pressure, who are nurturing plans to create ever new types of nuclear weapons on earth, who have set themselves the aim of unleashing the arms race in space."

What then is the real reason for Washington's reluctance to reciprocate with regard to the Soviet moratorium, to take as a guideline the resolution recently approved by the U.S. House of Representatives and urging the White House to immediately resume talks with a view to concluding a treaty on a total and universal ban on nuclear weapons tests and submit to congress for ratification the 1974 and 1976 Soviet-U.S. treaties on underground nuclear tests? Lost in the text of the President's letter to Congress in the middle of fabricated "arguments" the reply from the head of the administration is as follows: "Today and in the foreseeable future the security of the United States and its friends and allies must be based on a reliable and effective nuclear deterrent."

But it follows from this that the present U.S. Administration is not even thinking of eliminating nuclear weapons and is continuing to be guided by the "doctrine of deterrence." It seems to sound fine. But eloquence in this case is nothing but camouflage for the doctrine which the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th party congress described as encouraging the arms race. The U.S. President's letter is also objectively aimed at encouraging this race, confirming the White House's reluctance to take a step halfway toward the elimination of nuclear explosions from the life of mankind.

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CSO: 5200/1294

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: U.S. PROPOSAL EVASION OF SOVIET TEST BAN OFFER

LD151046 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1022 GMT 15 Mar 86

[Text] Washington March 15 TASS -- The White House has said that President Reagan has put forward a proposal on the limitation of nuclear testing. Yet this proposal, which the White House described as highly specific and far reaching, has proved, in the opinion of political observers, to be a new U.S. political maneuver aimed at evading a concrete answer to the Soviet Union's proposal on ending all nuclear testing.

Reagan's proposal is of a very limited character and concerns only technical problems of "verification" of the Treaty on the Limitation on Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. These treaties were concluded between the USSR and the United States in 1974 and 1976 respectively, but have not been ratified so far, by no means through the Soviet side's fault.

Moreover, it follows from the White House statement that the United States is planning to conduct a new nuclear weapons test in Nevada in the third week of April. To camouflage its obviously negative stand on ending all nuclear explosions, the U.S. Administration has again resorted to the already familiar propaganda gimmick, by proposing that the Soviet Union send its scientists to watch these tests.

The Soviet Union, as known, is in favor of verifying [kontrol] the cessation of nuclear explosions, but it is against the cessation of tests being substituted by their continuation in the presence of observers. Disarmament without verification [kontrol] is impossible, but verification [kontrol] without disarmament makes no sense either.

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CSO: 5200/1294

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### 14 MARCH FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESS CONFERENCE REPORTED

#### TASS Report

PM161509 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Mar 86 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "End Nuclear Tests; Moscow Press Conference"]

[Text] A press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists was held at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center 14 March in connection with the reply by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the joint message from the leaders of Argentina, India, Mexico, Tanzania, Sweden, and Greece on the question of ending nuclear tests. The press conference was chaired by V.G. Komplektov, USSR deputy foreign minister; V.F. Petrovskiy, member of the USSR Foreign Ministry Collegium; Academician M.A. Sadovskiy, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Earth Physics Institute; Colonel General N.F. Chervov, chief of a USSR Armed Forces General Staff Directorate; and V.V. Lomeyko, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Section.

The press conference opening statement stated that the appeals by prestigious figures from countries in various continents to the Soviet and U.S. leadership on urgent questions of the day have been a significant factor in international life promoting the arrangement and development of extensive dialogue in the world.

The Soviet Union makes a high assessment of the activity of the influential figures in the six countries who, through their efforts, are promoting an improvement in the international situation and the quest for mutually acceptable accords in the interests of security for all.

The correspondents' attention was drawn first and foremost to the fact that, in response to the appeal from the leaders of the six countries addressed to the USSR and the United States not to conduct any nuclear tests in the period prior to the next Soviet-U.S. summit, the Soviet Union states that it will not conduct any nuclear explosions even after 31 March -- until the first nuclear explosion in the United States. The Soviet Union is thereby demonstrating its highly responsible attitude to the problem of a nuclear test ban. It is now up to the U.S. Administration, to which the appeal to join the moratorium is primarily addressed.

Not conducting tests means putting a stop to the improvement of nuclear weapons and starting practical movement toward their complete and universal elimination. If there is a real desire for this goal there can be no reason for not taking that step.

Not conducting nuclear explosions -- which it is proposed to start in practice with a joint Soviet-U.S. moratorium -- is seen by us as a radical solution to the problem of nuclear weapons tests. The USSR, as M.S. Gorbachev stressed in his reply to the message, attaches great importance to drawing up an agreement on the complete and final resolution of this problem in international law and proposes embarking on the elaboration of a corresponding treaty on a bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral basis with no linkage to any other questions.

The provision of adequate verification [kontrol] of the observance of accords on ending nuclear weapons tests is, the USSR believes, of particular importance. And the Soviet Union, as is well known, is decisively in favor of such verification, and the most strict verification at that. We have already suggested to the U.S. side that meetings between experts from the two countries be arranged in order to elaborate the relevant procedures for the reciprocal nonconducting of nuclear explosions.

At the same time the leaders of the "six" were informed that the Soviet Union is prepared to make use of their proposal -- if adopted by the U.S. side -- to provide assistance in monitoring [proverka] the ending of nuclear tests, including on-site inspection [inspektsiya].

The Soviet Union sees the ending of all nuclear weapons tests as one of the most important elements in shaping the comprehensive international security system whose fundamental basis was formulated by the 27th CPSU Congress. The ideas expressed in the appeal by the leaders of the six countries on universal security without nuclear weapons are very much in accordance with the Soviet concept of creating such an international security system. The hope was expressed that the U.S. Government will show political realism, assume a constructive stance, and respond positively to the peoples' demands to end nuclear tests.

The press conference participants replied to numerous questions from journalists.

Question: The proposals on specific questions aimed at ending the arms race contained in the message from the leaders of the "Delhi Six" are linked with the idea of creating a concept of universal security without nuclear weapons. Is there any similarity here with the Soviet approach to the problem of creating a comprehensive international security system?

Answer: The ideas expressed in the message from the leaders of the six countries about universal security without nuclear weapons are very much in accordance with the concept of the creation of a comprehensive international security system set forth in the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th party congress. Among other aspects uniting our approaches to this problem is the common understanding of the need to end all nuclear weapons tests and eliminate nuclear weapons entirely.

The fundamental basis of this system in the military, political, economic, and humanitarian spheres set forth in the Political Report offers broad scope for productive activity by all governments, parties, and social organizations and movements. It creates a framework for direct, open, and systematic dialogue among the leaders of the countries of the world community. It seems to us that the activity of the authors of the "Delhi Declaration" in this regard is a weighty contribution to the creation of an international security system and we are prepared to continue and develop a useful dialogue with them.

Question: One's attention is drawn to the fact that M.S. Gorbachev's reply also proposes bilateral talks alongside trilateral and multilateral talks on the total prohibition of nuclear tests. Is this seemingly a new element in the USSR's position? Could you explain what is in mind?

Answer: Yes, it is a new element. We are now proposing -- alongside trilateral and multilateral talks, to which we continue to attach great importance -- bilateral Soviet-U.S. talks on questions concerning the problems of the complete ending of nuclear tests. It has been officially proposed to the U.S. side that the talks should start this April in Moscow, Washington, or Geneva. As you can see, we are prepared to hold talks in any form. It is important to get moving on the problem of ending tests. The Soviet Union and the United States can and must set an example in this. We have informed the U.S. side that A.M. Petrosyants, chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, will head the Soviet delegation at the talks.

Question: In advocating the ending of nuclear weapons tests, is not the Soviet Union trying to reinforce its superiority over the United States in the sphere of the creation and improvement of nuclear weapons?

Answer: That could be said if it were not the Soviet Union but the United States that was lagging behind in the sphere of nuclear weapons tests. However, the facts show the opposite. According to figures from the Swedish Defense Research Institute, since 1945 the United States has tested one-third more nuclear devices than the USSR, and 50 per cent more if the other Western powers are included.

Question: People in the West, particularly the United States, are voicing doubts about the possibility of verifying [kontrol] the nonconducting of nuclear tests. They say that the Soviet Union, while paying lip service to the importance of verification [kontrol], is actually not prepared to accede to it on Soviet territory. What can you say on that score?

Answer: Both these allegations do not correspond to reality. Our country is no less interested in the reliability and strictness of verification [kontrol] than anyone else. Be it verification [kontrol] using national technical means or international means. As long as it is verification [kontrol] of the observance of specific accords. In short, the USSR is open to verification [kontrol].

But I would like to draw attention to the fact that the entire territory of the Soviet Union is surrounded by stations set up by the United States or under its leadership. They number approximately 200 as against our approximately 20. That is, a 10:1 ratio. The Soviet Union agrees to maintain reciprocal verification [kontrol] even under these conditions. We believe that our 20 stations are sufficient in order to monitor nuclear tests carried out beyond our borders. We have yet to miss any tests. Do 200 U.S. stations with an incredible amount of top-notch equipment really function worse than 20 of our stations? The Americans themselves have written that the system currently in existence in the world is entirely adequate for recording all underground nuclear explosions, even low-level ones.



So the only thing that could prevent verification [kontrol] being organized is the clear reluctance on the U.S. side. Back in 1958 agreed conditions were drawn up whereby the Americans, British, French, and ourselves endorsed [podpisalis v] the possibility of guaranteeing the detection of all nuclear explosions that might take place. And then began a 28-year period of foot-dragging. There is no other description for it.

Replies were also given to journalists' other questions.

#### Further Report

LD141545 Moscow TASS in English 1536 GMT 14 Mar 86

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS -- In connection with the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions announced by the Soviet side, we have twice named the timeframe for its operations, but a positive response from the USA came in neither case, said Viktor Komplektov, USSR deputy foreign minister. He spoke today in the Press Centre of the USSR Foreign Ministry at a press conference on the question of ending nuclear tests.

Having refrained from explosions for a relatively long time, the Soviet Union has paid a certain price, both militarily and economically. In these conditions, we cannot extend the moratorium indefinitely, without considering the stand of the USA, the deputy minister said.

Therefore, the question of the further destiny of the moratorium now hinges on the USA, on whether the U.S. Administration is capable of showing political will. Meanwhile, our stand is absolutely clear: We wish that there should be no nuclear explosions, that the problem of banning nuclear testing be resolved fully and ultimately.

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CSO: 5200/1294

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### MOSCOW TV ON WESTERN SINCERITY ON TEST BAN

LD152223 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 15 Mar 86

[Commentary by Gennadiy Gerasimov, APN political observer; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Hello, comrades! In the message of leaders of the six countries to the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States containing an appeal to refrain from nuclear explosions at least until the summit, there is the phrase: As long as nuclear weapons exist there can be no security in the world. It appears at first glance that there is no doubt to that; this phrase is an axiom. But listen to what the British ECONOMIST writes. It writes that even if our planet had been visited by inspectors from Mars and Venus and in this way or another they would have banned nuclear weapons, many earthlings would have thought: Is it really for the better? And they would have had questionable reasons for that.

What kind of reasons are those? In the line of reasoning of, for example, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, or U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, it appears that nuclear weapons are necessary for so-called containment [sderzhivaniye]. Accordingly, nuclear tests are also necessary, because, as Mrs Thatcher put it, if the containment forces are not modernized, they soon cease to be what they are.

Meanwhile, it was quite recently that President Reagan himself criticized the concept of nuclear containment, criticized it for being immoral. This concept treats the civilian population as hostages and envisions its annihilation in revenge for an attack. What we have as a result is not defense at all, but bloody vengeance. Now, as soon as the Soviet Union put forward a concrete program of eliminating nuclear weapons -- and by the way, Reagan maintained that such elimination was his dream -- as soon as our country introduced a moratorium on tests, as soon as other countries urged the leading nuclear powers to join the moratorium, it turned out that one cannot do without nuclear weapons; or to be more exact, it is more dangerous to live without them than with them. So, it turned out to be a u-turn.

The reason is that the test advocates' arguments have been discarded one after another. The argument concerning control, which reflects the position that the Russians cannot be trusted has been discarded -- because we are in favor of control, including participation of a third country. The argument about the U.S. backlog has also been dropped, a dishonest argument concerning the nuclear arsenals becoming outdated without periodic checks through tests has also been dropped, because it is equally applicable to the Soviet side. Now, the last line of defense is being assumed: the West needs nuclear containment. But what about the President's dream of eliminating nuclear weapons? What about his promise to strive jointly for halting the nuclear arms race on earth and preventing it from spreading to space? The issue of nuclear tests is like a litmus paper: it shows the sincerity of one's intentions.

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: GDR STATEMENT HAILS USSR MORATORIUM EXTENSION

LD141730 Moscow TASS in English 1704 GMT 14 Mar 86

[Text] Berlin March 14 TASS -- The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Council of State and the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic today issued a joint statement hailing the Soviet Union's decision not to conduct nuclear explosions also after March 31 -- until the first nuclear explosion in the United States.

This position taken by the USSR, the statement said, demonstrates its unwavering determination to put an end to the arms race and secure effective steps to disarmament.

It also facilitates the fulfilment of the unique program for the stage-by-stage deliverance of mankind from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, the statement added.

It said further that the joint message of the leaders of Argentina, India, Mexico, Tanzania, Sweden and Greece and the reply to that message by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, reflects a desire to halt the further upgrading of nuclear weapons by stopping nuclear explosions and create favorable conditions for measures to terminate the arms race on earth and prevent it from spilling over into outer space. This stand, the statement said, is fully supported by the GDR. The state statement noted the Soviet leader's reply makes clear-cut proposals on verification. After the latest constructive step by the USSR it is now the U.S. turn to contribute to an end to nuclear blasts by stopping its nuclear testing.

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CSO: 5200/1294

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### TASS OBSERVER ON NUCLEAR MORATORIUM ISSUE

LD142334 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2233 GMT 14 Mar 86

[Text] Moscow, 15 Mar (TASS) -- TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev writes:

In the postwar years, the United States has carried out more nuclear weapons tests than all the other countries of the world put together. Nevertheless, President Reagan considers that the Soviet Union has acted "unjustly" in relation to the United States in calling upon it to join in the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions declared almost 8 months ago. The United States cannot now speak of a ban on nuclear explosions, the President said in an interview to the American BALTIMORE SUN newspaper.

Having spent more than a trillion dollars in the last 5 years on preparations for war, Reagan alleges that the Soviet Union is still outstripping the United States in the military sphere, and that stopping American nuclear tests will -- according to him -- "leave the United States in a position where it is increasingly lagging behind." The President preferred not to specify how many more trillion dollars he intends to spend on nuclear armaments in order to get close to what he described as the "United States' long-term aim" -- the cessation of nuclear tests.

Washington's refusal to come to agreement on a total cessation of nuclear explosions illuminates before the whole world the present U.S. Administration's obstructionist position on the whole spectrum of problems of limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, and shows the insincerity of statements by U.S. officials about their aspiration "to make nuclear weapons outmoded and powerless". Under these conditions, the U.S. Administration is compelled to dodge and maneuver.

Speaking about the "danger" of a moratorium, the President reaches the absurd conclusion that an accord on ending nuclear explosions will allegedly be possible only "at a time when the nuclear forces of restraint are no longer such an essential element of international security and stability as at present." Putting forward this abstruse thesis, the U.S. Administration is attempting to prove that the path to stability and mutual trust is through the unlimited build up and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union proposes banning tests of nuclear weapons, thereby taking an important step along the path to eliminating arsenals of mass attack. Washington is attempting to legalize nuclear weapons tests.

Instead of the measures for effectively verifying observation of a ban on nuclear explosions put forward by the Soviet Union, Washington is proposing the creation of an

"inspection" for observing the continuation of these tests. Against all logic, the White House is even trying to portray this initiative as almost a good will gesture by the United States...

For the 8th month in succession, the USSR has not carried out any nuclear explosions, having given the U.S. Administration extra time to weigh the Soviet proposals. In making this goodwill gesture the Soviet Union has incurred some expenses, both in military and national economic respects. The unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions cannot continue indefinitely.

The Soviet Union has announced that it will not carry out nuclear explosions after 31 March either, until the United States' first nuclear explosion.

The U.S. Administration will now have just as much time to evaluate the impact of a nuclear moratorium on the stability of the world situation as it wishes.

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CSO: 5200/1294

## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### GDR'S AXEN, SED DELEGATION ARRIVE IN BONN

LD141237 Hamburg DPA in German 1139 GMT 14 Feb 86

[Excerpt] Bonn, 14 Feb (DPA) -- An SED delegation arrived in Bonn today to continue talks with the SPD parliamentary party on a nuclear weapons-free zone in Europe. The SED delegation is headed by Politburo member Hermann Axen, who will also have a meeting this evening with Wolfgang Schaueble (CDU), minister in the Chancellor's Office responsible for German policy. The SPD group is headed by disarmament expert Egon Bahr. The two delegations have already had one meeting -- in December in East Berlin.

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CSO: 5200/2631

## RELATED ISSUES

### USSR'S SHEVARDNADZE ADDRESSES 27TH CPSU CONGRESS

PM021428 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 86 Second Edition pp 3,4

["Speech by USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze" (PRAVDA) headline delivered at 28 February afternoon session of 27th CPSU Congress]

[Text] Comrades! There have been congresses in the history of the party and the state that have been styled as unscheduled or extraordinary. Ours is a scheduled congress. But it will go down in history as a turning point in the life of the country and the party, as the congress of innovators.

There is no need to fear these words. There is no socialism without innovation, creativity, or transformations. Whenever an extreme situation arises, man starts thinking and acting in a special way. Now that the world is close to a crucial point, this ability could prove decisive for the whole of mankind.

The CPSU Central Committee's Political Report to the 27th party congress presents man and mankind on the common scale of contemporary problems.

Having assembled at a most crucial stage, the congress cannot fail to produce new ideas corresponding to the times. We have before us a code of principles of the new political thinking which have been expounded for the first time, and these principles make it possible to draw conclusions of fundamental importance for the fate of mankind.

First, a dangerous gap has developed between the realities of the nuclear age and the understanding of tasks facing the world. A fundamental review and decisive renunciation of old-fashioned philosophies and obsolete doctrines constitute a paramount and vital necessity.

Second, new economic, scientific, and technical factors shape the entire interdependent world, in which reality makes increasingly tough demands of every state's leaders and dictates utmost responsibility in behavior and decisionmaking.

And third, imperialism will under no circumstances abandon its fixed idea that the most progressive achievements of human thought, when embodied in means of destruction, are capable of perpetuating its domination and halting history's onward march. But the potential and nature of modern weapons are such that they deprive the policy of confrontation and antagonism of all meaning.

These conclusions are drawn on the basis of impeccable Marxist-Leninist analysis of the epoch's trends and contradictions.

A ominous background, but this analysis does not create a feeling of hopelessness. Imbued by political optimism, the report indicates prospects which are common for all mankind and creates a mood for struggle against the growing avalanche of destructive processes.

How are these to be halted? What new ground can be broken? The answer to these questions is contained in the entire series of energetic practical steps undertaken by the Soviet leadership since April 1985.

These 10 months have revived people's hopes. A new style and the force of logic and conviction were manifested in M.S. Gorbachev's conversations with statesmen and public figures from various countries, during his visit to Paris, and at the Geneva meeting with the U.S. President. But the concept of a nuclear-free world, put forward by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in the 15 January statement, was an event of truly momentous significance.

Being a model of the new approach, a synthesis of profound thinking and of original analysis of contemporary realities and

specific and practically feasible measures, the statement has already acquired the nature of a physical force. It was this force which compelled the U.S. Administration to take cover behind a palisade of reservations, linkages, and conditions.

What guided the Soviet Union when it put forward the program for universal security through disarmament? The firm belief that the objectives set in this program are equally desirable and precious for all peoples on earth.

What did we plan on in proposing the comprehensive plan for stage-by-stage liquidation of nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons? On the support of those who share our views, of our allies, friends, and class brothers, whose best representatives are present at our congress. (Applause). The statement expresses the coordinated opinion of the socialist community and the interests of progressive forces and all people of good will.

The historic concept of a nuclear-free world was conceived in the course of the Soviet leadership's comradely dialogue with the fraternal states' leaders. Never before has there been such a productive exchange of opinions and such a thorough coordination of joint actions as during the past few months, which were marked by four meetings of top party and state leaders of Warsaw Pact countries and conversations with a broad circle of representatives from socialist and nonaligned states.

It would appear that everything is perfectly clear and simple: Nuclear weapons are something terrible, immoral, and unnatural. Nevertheless, no sooner is a call made for their total liquidation than "advocates" immediately appear to present them as almost a universal boon. Today they are again trying to prove that these weapons are supposedly necessary as a factor of mutual deterrence, claiming that it is impossible to manage without them. The assessment of the U.S. side's stance, contained in the Central Committee's Political Report, was fully confirmed after the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks provided additional clarifications of this stance. We failed to discover any new, let alone constructive, elements in it.

A few words about the West's attitude in connection with our proposals on medium-range missiles in Europe.

We heard in the course of conversations with a number of statesmen from NATO countries: Progress in our relations will depend on your readiness to remove Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe. Do not link this problem with strategic arms and space.

Strange metamorphoses are to be detected, however, now that readiness has been clearly expressed to do precisely this and to fully liquidate Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in the European zone on a mutual basis. Our recent interlocutors are obviously losing their enthusiasm and are resorting to more and more reservations.

Questions concerning the military balance in Asia, whose practical solution is envisaged by the Soviet program at the appropriate stage, are artificially dragged into this in an attempt to complicate the reaching of an agreement.

The only thing we want from France and Britain, in the event an accord is reached with the United States, is for them not to build up quantitatively their relevant nuclear arms. All questions concerning this issue could be the subject of direct exchange of opinions with France and Britain.

It must be said plainly: Not at the expense [ne za schet] of French and British nuclear weapons; this is, of course, a compromise option going against the customary arms race logic. [Nado skazat bez obinyakov: ne za schet yadernykh vooruzheniy Frantsii i Anglii — eto, konechno, kompromissnyy variant, lomayushchiy privychnuyu logiku gonki vooruzheniy.] Now is the time for West Europe to have its say and show its face. The extent of its political responsibility is today being subjected to a serious test.

A few words about another important aspect — about Soviet enhanced-range operational-tactical missiles. What will happen to them? I will answer. If U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe are liquidated, there will no longer be any need to keep Soviet operational-tactical missiles where they have been deployed.

We are calling for joint efforts in order to organize our all-European apartment block in such a way that all peoples inhabiting it feel secure in their own national apartments.

You see, it does not suit the opponents of our nuclear disarmament program that it combines the reduction of strategic nuclear means with a ban on the creation [sozdaniye] of strike space weapons. Yes, this is so, and the reason why is simple: No matter how much the "star wars" program may be camouflaged beneath its defense orientation, it is at least a "twin" of nuclear weapons.

Our answer to those who advise us to lift our objections to the "Strategic Defense Initiative" is: The Soviet Union and the Soviet people will play no part in any deception of mankind. (Applause).

The concept formulated in the January statement goes much further than the idea of a nuclear-free future. In our view, the liquidation of nuclear and chemical weapons must be accompanied by corresponding stabilizing reductions in conventional arms. At the same time, this is a permanent process of reorienting political and public awareness and laying completely new foundations of universal security — political, economic, legal, humanitarian, moral, and ethical.

The transition to a qualitatively different level of regulating interstate relations demands primarily a decisive democratization of all international life.

The attainment of the Soviet initiative's main objective would mean the taking of a gigantic step toward the creation of conditions for true democracy. The nuclear so-called "club of select powers" would be liquidated and the countries in the world would de facto become more equal. States' confidence in one another would increase.

The democratic nature of any country's foreign policy is measured by the extent to which its actions in the international arena



meet the criteria and norms set by the overwhelming majority of the world community's members, by its rigorous adherence to international law and order.

Many proclaim democracy in international politics. The question is, however, who imparts what meaning to this term.

The obstructionist U.S. stance on the question of terminating nuclear tests is the direct antipode of democratic approach to international relations. The United States will not terminate nuclear tests for as long as nuclear weapons exist, that country's defense minister Weinberger declared a few days ago. It cannot be said more clearly: The Administration does not desire any real positive developments in the liquidation of these weapons. At the last UN General Assembly session, 120 states voted on 4 occasions in favor of a resolution demanding an end to nuclear weapon tests. But the U.S. Government feels no ethical discomfort when confronted with the fact of such unanimous condemnation of its stance. In the same way it feels no discomfort when facing its own Congress, which has only just voted in principle for the termination of nuclear tests.

Every state implements a foreign policy which corresponds with its own national interests. Even here, however, the question is how are these interests perceived by whom. By proclaiming entire regions, continents, and oceans de facto to be zones of its interests, the United States is subordinating other peoples' sovereignty and independence to its own political and economic expansionism. It proclaims legitimate governments to be illegal.

The U.S. linkage of nuclear disarmament with the settlement of regional conflicts is the ultimate in hypocrisy.

Those who themselves are helping to maintain and expand regional conflicts are the ones who are talking about them.

Washington makes no secret of the fact that one of the "star wars" program's fundamental objectives is to capture strategic commanding heights. The domination of space could ensure domination on earth. This program is a strategy for a new enslavement of peoples, for making them submit to imperialist diktat.

If space arms were to be created [sozdaniye], only those who possess such arms would have a chance to remain free and independent.

The Soviet Union would not wish this, but it can create [sozdat] everything that will be necessary to ensure its own security and the defense of its allies and friends. (Applause).

We say to the Americans: Do not burden your conscience with a new grave sin, do not release the space jinn, you have already given the nuclear jinn as a gift to mankind.

I will emphasize something else: Having once agreed to ban the creation [sozdaniye] of strike space weapons, the Soviet Union and the United States could conduct talks on any aspect of permissible research in the space sphere. We are in favor of the most daring cooperation programs in the peaceful exploration of space.

Yes, socialism and the socialist countries are vitally interested in the implementation of our concept of peace. But all peoples on our planet need it equally as much.

Stereotyped thinking is at times stronger than the metal of weapons. Before scrapping the tools of death, it is necessary to scrap these stereotypes.

We declare: Peace is in keeping with the supreme class interests of socialism.

Are the U.S. leaders capable of rising to the same summit of concern for the whole of mankind?

To judge by many indications, and particularly by President Reagan's statement last Wednesday [26 February], hitherto they have obviously been incapable of it. Let us leave to his aides' conscience the esoteric figures and deductions which he manipulated. "Strength is the most convincing argument.... We negotiate with the Russians from positions of strength." These are the President's words. They can be trusted only by a philistine, and not even a contemporary one at that.

We have no intention of giving free reign to emotions. The Soviet Union is a convinced champion of solid and honest dialogue. This was said precisely and clearly in the Political Report to our congress. (Applause)

We shall see how we can be forced to do anything if our people say "No!" (Applause).

Talks are conducted by mutual agreement and on an equal basis. They can, of course, be conducted in different ways. Diplomacy is, of course, a delicate matter, but not so delicate as to break the thread of talks and interrupt the dialogue. We are interested in fruitfulness, and therefore set the practical task of improving the machinery of talks. To conduct matters so as to reveal the entire well-argued nature, substantiation, fairness, and honesty of our proposals, bearing always in mind the attainment of a practical outcome. In the language of our congress — end results.

Recently, we have been increasingly often reproached for the publicity of our foreign policy actions, claiming that we are engaging in propaganda. Yes, we attach great significance to open diplomacy. It was applied most effectively by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in his Paris and Geneva utterances. Here too we are faced with the question: How is propaganda understood by whom? In the West, it is associated with demagoguery and rhetoric. In our view, propaganda means identity of words and deeds, a method of directly addressing the world public opinion. It carries the lessons of truth. Let those who can, learn from them. (Applause)

Comrades! The party is determining the program directions of its foreign policy under the prevailing specific conditions. Its main objective is to ensure for the Soviet people the opportunity to work under conditions of peace and freedom. The primary means is to halt material preparations for nuclear war. The primary avenue is to implement the program for the total liquidation of all types of mass destruction weapons by the end of the century and block the path for arms in space. The primary

principle is to approach the security problem as an exclusively political one and to solve it on the basis of equality, reciprocity, and universality.

This strategy of peace is created by the millions. Foreign policy in our country serves the working man, and it is he who vests in statesmen and diplomats the power to practically implement it. The worker at his lathe, the miner at the face, the milkmaid at the stock unit, the serviceman on combat alert, the scientist in the laboratory, and the artist in the studio — these are the sources of our foreign policy, the ones who give us strength, energy, and confidence in the correctness of our cause. (Applause).

The fact that foreign policy is the result of the people's collective creativity presupposes a particular responsibility to them of all foreign policy departments. Enormous work has definitely been done here, comrades, and most valuable experience has been accumulated in the conduct of international affairs.

At the same time, foreign policy institutions cannot be some kind of prohibited zone, closed to criticism and self-criticism. Even more so in view of the fact that they also have their own problems and reserves, particularly as regards the enhancement of the activeness and dynamism of Soviet diplomacy and the further scientific elaboration of its foundations.

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CSO: 5200/1292

I have worked as minister for only a short while. It would seem rather early to engage in self-criticism. And if I have an opportunity to address the 28th congress, then I will, of course, speak about both achievements and shortcomings; I will speak openly and self-critically. (Applause).

In the last few months I have had quite a few meetings with representatives of different states. They asked numerous questions, which testified to the keenest interest abroad in events in the life of our country and our people since the CPSU Central Committee April Plenum. Exhaustive answers to all these questions are provided by the Central Committee's Political Report and the actual atmosphere of work at the party congress.

What is particularly important today is the effective and well-organized functioning of every cell of our society, of every link in the party. An atmosphere of tireless quest and discovery of bold and correct solutions has been established in the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo. The total freedom of creativity, the freedom to discuss all issues, the profound democracy, and the strict exactingness are inspiring. If this example were to spread to all party organizations and to all labor and creative collectives, then there can be no doubt that all the tasks set by our congress will be fulfilled. (Applause).

## RELATED ISSUES

### USSR DEFENSE MINISTER ADDRESSES 27TH CPSU CONGRESS

PM021515 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 86 Second Edition p 6

["Speech by S.L. Sokolov, USSR Defense Minister" (PRAVDA headline) delivered at 1 March session of 27th CPSU Congress]

[Excerpt] Esteemed comrades! The 27th CPSU Congress is strengthening and developing still further the qualitatively new, landmark stage in the heroic struggle of our party and the Soviet people for the attainment of the great communist goals. It is resolving and defining the strategy and tactics of our actions under the new historical conditions.

All these questions being examined at the congress in the light of the changed disposition of sociopolitical forces in the world, when scientific and technical progress is offering people tremendous opportunities but at the same time is also giving imperialist reaction vain hopes of using the latest scientific and technical achievements to try once again to reverse the course of social development. This imparts an acute and complex character to the political processes taking place in the world, poses in a new way the problems of war and peace, and forges an even closer link between our domestic and foreign policy problems and national economic and defense tasks.

The party Central Committee's Political Report delivered by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, gave a thorough creative analysis of these complex trends, summarized the results of the great path we have traveled, revealed the unresolved problems, and clearly defined the prospects for our society's future development. Such a bold and large-scale approach can only be undertaken by a party which is armed with the scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism, when the people have boundless faith in the party, and when the party's life is consonant with the interests of its people. (Applause) All the provisions of the CPSU Central Committee's Political Report are full of historic optimism and a profound belief in the correctness of our cause. They inspire each of us with a sense of legitimate pride in what has been done and unshakable confidence that what the party has planned can, must, and will be carried out!

Army and Navy servicemen unanimously support the aims and tasks set out in the Political Report and ardently approve the domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party and Soviet Government.

For 68 years the country's Armed Forces have reliably defended the gains of the October Revolution. More than once they have had to take up arms to defend their motherland's independence. No one will ever forget the great feat of the Soviet people and our Army and Navy servicemen on the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War. In the postwar period the Armed Forces have always been and remain the reliable guarantor of peace and the socialist fatherland's security. (Applause)

In the past 40 years the threat of a new world war had loomed over the world more than once. Plans for a nuclear attack on our country have repeatedly been hatched in the United States. And if imperialism has not yet dared to implement them, then that is primarily because it has been deterred by our state's military and economic might and the inevitability of counterstrikes against the aggressor.

In recent years the imperialist states, acting on the basis of their aggressive policy, have stepped up their war preparations more and more. The United States is intensively deploying ground-, air-, and sea-based strategic offensive forces and is developing [razrabotaka] weapons based on new physical principles. The number of U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe is increasing. The United States is reorganizing its armed forces with a view to considerably increasing their combat potential. Entire regions of the world, thousands of kilometers from the United States, are declared zones of its "national interests." The so-called "Rapid Deployment Force" is being actively prepared for piratical and aggressive actions in those regions.

Similar war preparations are also being carried out in the other NATO countries. That aggressive military bloc's total grouping of armed forces in Europe numbers over 3 million men, around 17,000 tanks, more than 4,000 warplanes, and more than 7,000 nuclear munitions. It is based on mass professional armies, which are being trained intensively. A particular danger is posed by the U.S. schemes to implement the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative," which envisages deploying strike weapons in space.

The main purpose of these actions is to gain a decisive military superiority over the USSR and secure the potential to threaten to deliver a first nuclear strike. In this way the real threat of the unleashing of war against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries is being created. We cannot ignore that fact.

The CPSU proceeds from the premise that no matter how great

the threat to peace posed by the aggressive imperialist circles' policy, world war is not a fatal inevitability; and the Soviet Union is campaigning actively and persistently for peace and making tremendous efforts to prevent war. Comrade Gorbachev's 15 January statement put forward a concrete and well-substantiated program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the world.

How did the United States respond to the Soviet peace initiatives? Familiarization with its response shows its lack of constructiveness. It contains no solution to the main, fundamental question — preventing an arms race in space. On strategic arms and medium-range nuclear means it repeats virtually unchanged the old U.S. proposal designed to secure unilateral advantages. The U.S. Administration has taken up a frankly negative stance on the question of banning nuclear weapon tests, which can only be viewed as Washington's desire to continue the nuclear arms race.

The experience of the postwar years demonstrates that each new round in the arms race has been initiated by the United States. The Soviet Union has been forced to react accordingly and, as is well known, has found a fitting reply each time. If we are forced to do so again, our side will also find an effective response to space arms. (Applause) But that will not be our choice.

In conditions whereby the imperialist states are not only rejecting our peace-loving proposals but are also intensifying their war preparations and openly proclaiming a course aimed at eliminating socialism as a social system, it is necessary, as the CPSU Central Committee's Political Report notes, to continue to combine organically in our policy the tireless struggle for peace with the readiness to firmly rebuff any aggression.

Lenin's tenet that imperialism is the source of wars and the threat of war is also true today. This requires that Soviet people and our Armed Forces show high vigilance and constant readiness to defend the socialist motherland.

In the past it was believed that states harboring aggressive plans are better prepared for war than peace-loving states. Even then it was impossible to accept this. But under modern conditions it is even less acceptable.

Taking all that into account, the draft new edition of the CPSU Program stresses that the CPSU will make every effort to ensure that the USSR Armed Forces are at a level which precludes the military superiority of the imperialist forces, and to ensure that the Soviet state's defense capability is comprehensively improved.

The cornerstone of the strengthening of the socialist motherland's defense is the Communist Party's leadership of military building and of the Armed Forces. Under its leading role policy in the sphere of the country's defense and Soviet military doctrine aimed at defense from external attack are formulated and implemented [Pri yeye rukovodyashchey roli vyrabatyvayutsya i osushchestvlyayutsya politika v oblasti oborony strany, sovetskaya voyennaya doktrina, napravlyennaya na zashchitu ot napadeniya izvne]. I deem it my duty to report to the congress that the party Central Committee, the Politburo above all, and the Defense Council are constantly examining questions of Armed Forces building and training in a specific, thorough, and exacting way. The establishment of military equilibrium between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO was a convincing result of our party's activity and a historic achievement of socialism.

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## RELATED ISSUES

### GORBACHEV CLOSES PROCEEDINGS AT 27TH CPSU CONGRESS

LD061119 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0909 GMT 6 Mar 86

["Concluding speech" by Mikhail Surgeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the final session of the 27th CPSU Congress in the Kremlin palace of Congresses---live]

#### [Excerpts]

Comrades, the congress has once again convincingly demonstrated the inseparability of socialism and peace, and of peace and creation. Socialism would not be fulfilling its historic mission were it not to head the struggle for delivering mankind from the burden of anxiety about war and violence. The main purpose of Soviet policy is a secure and just peace for all peoples. [applause] We view the struggle against war and military preparations, and against the preaching of hatred and violence as an inseparable part of democratization of all international relations and genuine improvement of the world's political climate. [applause]

The nuclear threat has at one stroke made states equal in one respect. In a great war, no one can sit on the sidelines or warm their hands over another's misfortune. Equal security is the dominant imperative of the time. [applause] Also, guaranteeing that equal security is increasingly becoming a political task that can be resolved by political means alone. It is time to underpin the relations between states with a foundation which is more stable than weapons. We see no other alternative, nor do we seek one. [applause]

Unfortunately, however, there are those in the international community who still aspire to a special security suited to them alone. The frame of mind in Washington bears witness to this. As before, calls for being strong, which continue to be regarded as the most convincing argument of world policy, are in vogue there. It seems as though some people are simply afraid of the opportunities that have arisen for a serious, long-term thaw in Soviet-U.S. relations and in the international situation as a whole.

This is not the first time we have confronted such a situation. The militarist and aggressive forces would, of course, currently prefer to freeze and perpetuate confrontation. But what are we supposed to do, comrades? Slam the door? It is not excluded that this is exactly what they are urging us to do.

We are very well aware, however, of our responsibility for the fate of the country and the fate of the world. We therefore have no intention of playing into the hands of those who would wish to compel mankind to learn to live with the nuclear threat and the arms race. [applause]

Soviet foreign policy is oriented toward the search for mutual understanding, toward dialogue, and toward the assertion of peaceful coexistence as a universal norm in relations between states. We have both a clear realization of how to attain this and a concrete program of work for the sake of preserving and consolidating peace. [applause]

The Soviet Union acts, and will continue to act, on the world stage in a way that is serious and open, active and honest. We intend to use persistence and initiative in seeking the elimination of nuclear weapons, a radical limiting of the arms race, and the building of international security that is reliable and equal for all states.

A mandate for the preservation of peace and a curbing of the arms race rang out forcefully and passionately in the addresses by delegates to our congress. The party will unswervingly follow this mandate. [applause]

We appeal to the leaders of states with a different social system to take a responsible approach to what is today the key problem in world politics — that of war and peace. The leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet State will do everything to ensure for our people the possibility of laboring in conditions of lasting peace and freedom. [applause]

As the congress has once again confirmed, our party, the Land of the Soviets have many allies, supporters, and partners abroad in the struggle for peace, freedom, and progress for mankind. We are sincerely glad to see here the leaders of socialist countries.

Permit me, on behalf of the congress, to express heartfelt indebtedness to the communist parties and peoples of those countries for their solidarity with the CPSU and the Soviet Union. [applause]

This has also been a congress year for a number of fraternal parties of the socialist states. The problems and tasks which the very development of history sets for the ruling communist parties are very similar in many ways. And in meeting them, each one makes its own contribution to the common treasure house of the combined experience of world socialism.

I wish you success, dear friends! [applause]

The CPSU is grateful for the warm words said about it by the representatives of the communist, revolutionary-democratic, socialist and social-democratic parties, and the democratic, liberation, and antiwar forces and movements. We highly appraise their understanding and support for the idea advanced by the congress for the creation of an all-embracing system of international security and for the plan for the liquidation of nuclear weapons before the end of the present century. The CPSU is convinced that they meet the true interests of all peoples and all countries — all mankind. [applause]

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## RELATED ISSUES

### PRAVDA PUBLISHES CEAUSESCU SPEECH AT 27TH CPSU CONGRESS

PM281208 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Feb 86 Second Edition p 7

[Speech by RCP Secretary General Nicolae Ceausescu at the 27 February Moscow session of the 27th CPSU Congress]

[Excerpts] Dear Comrade Gorbachev,  
dear comrades and friends,

I have the particular pleasure of extending--on behalf of the RCP, all our people, and myself personally--warm revolutionary greetings and best wishes to the 27th CPSU Congress delegates, all Soviet Communists, and the friendly Soviet peoples. (applause)

Dear comrades, the international situation continues to remain very serious and tense as a result of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and the imperialist policy of force and interference in the domestic affairs of other states. This leads to increasing the danger of a new world war, which would inevitably turn into a nuclear catastrophe and may result in the disappearance of conditions for the existence of life itself on our planet. Therefore, we believe that now the fundamental problem of mankind is to defend peace, stop the arms race, and proceed to concrete disarmament measures to eliminate nuclear weapons. We should do everything possible to defend the sacred right of nations and people to existence, a free and dignified life, and peace. (applause)

We welcome and fully support the Soviet Union's initiatives and proposals to reduce nuclear weapons by 50 percent, put an end to nuclear tests, and halt the militarization of outer space. We consider as very important the program proposed by the Soviet Union concerning the elimination of the entire arsenal of nuclear weapons by the end of the century, with the belief that no efforts should be spared to implement this program. The nations expect that the United States and its NATO allies should adopt a

realistic attitude and, on the basis of proposals advanced by both sides, steps should be taken to conclude appropriate agreements with a view to eliminating the danger of a nuclear war and halting the militarization of outer space.

A military balance between the two sides should not be achieved by increasing military arsenals, but rather by reducing armaments to the lowest level. This is in accordance with the interests of peoples and all mankind.

At the same time, resolute steps should be taken to substantially reduce troops, conventional weapons, and military expenditures, renounce the use of force, and solve all contentious problems between states through negotiation alone. We must always bear in mind that all states' socioeconomic development programs can only be implemented under conditions of peace and by radically reducing military expenditures. It is absolutely necessary to intensify the united struggle of all peoples and advanced forces everywhere for a new trend in international life toward disarmament, detente, cooperation, and peace. We believe that everything should be done to successfully conclude the Stockholm conference devoted to strengthening trust and bringing about disarmament in Europe and the Vienna negotiations on reducing troops and armaments in the center of the continent, and to ensure that the Geneva disarmament conference yields positive results.

Romania firmly advocates and works to create a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans, without chemical weapons, and to extend such areas in northern and central Europe and other parts of the world. In its entire foreign policy, Romania pays particular attention to developing relations of friendship and cooperation with socialist countries, particularly the neighboring ones. In this framework, we attach great importance to strengthening cooperation and collaboration with the Soviet Union.

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## RELATED ISSUES

### USSR'S GROMYKO MEETS WESTERN ANTI-WAR ACTIVISTS

LD171804 Moscow TASS in English 1744 GMT 17 Mar 86

[Text] Moscow March 17 TASS -- Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Andrey Gromyko today received in the Kremlin a group of foreign participants in the third information meeting -- seminar of representatives of anti-war organizations of Western Europe, USA and Canada.

The group includes prominent peace champions representing a wide spectrum of anti-militaristic forces in their countries; retired Brigadier General Michael Harbottle of Great Britain, director of the Centre for International Peace, administrator of the international group "Generals for Peace and Disarmament"; Hermod Lannung of Denmark, chairman of the National Preparatory Committee of the World Congress devoted to the International Year of Peace, member of the Radical Party's leadership, president of the World Association of World Federalists; Claudio Gentili, chief of the department of the struggle for peace and disarmament of the Christian Association of Italian Working People; Robert Penner, coordinator of the Canadian Peace Alliance; Howard Frazier of the USA, executive director of Promoting Enduring Peace; Rudolf Merker of the FRG, chairman of the Bonn district organization of the SDP [Social Democratic Party]; Eva Norland of Sweden, leader of the Women for Peace movement; leaders of peace organizations from Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Finland, France, Switzerland.

During the conversation which passed in a friendly atmosphere, Andrey Gromyko pointed out that the demands of peace champions in many countries are consonant with the recent Soviet peace initiatives.

The anti-war movements that have been launched in many states on all continents are highly assessed in the Soviet Union.

Andrey Gromyko dwelt particularly on the proposals set out in the Statement of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev of January 15, as well as on the foundations of the all-embracing system of international security which was set out in detail in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th congress of the Soviet Communists.

It was stressed that the program of consolidating peace which the Soviet Union is conducting consistently shows what must be done for the improvement of the international situation and solution of the cardinal problem of the present -- removal of the threat of war. The essence of this program is complete elimination of nuclear arms by the end



of the current century and prevention of the militarization of outer space. The Soviet peace initiatives are equally addressed to governments and peoples of all countries, large and small, no matter where they are situated, in the West or in the East, in the north or in the south.

Advancing its proposals the Soviet Union proceeds from the view that in conditions of nuclear menace [an] objective situation has formed in which confrontation between capitalism and socialism can proceed exclusively in the forms of peaceful competition and peaceful rivalry.

The participants in the conversation from foreign countries stressed that the Soviet proposals evoke broad response the world over. These proposals are highly assessed by peoples.

Taking part in the conversation were Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet A.E. Voss, Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet T.N. Menteshashvili, Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee G.A. Zhukov, deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

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## RELATED ISSUES

### USSR 2 MARCH WEEKLY 'INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS ROUNDTABLE'

LD022241 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 2 Mar 86

["International Observers Roundtable" program, presented by Nikolay Agayants, with Yuriy Kornilov, TASS political observer, and Aleksabder Zholkver, All-Union radio and television political observer]

[Excerpts] [Agayants] Hello comrades! The attention of literally the entire planet is glued to the work of the 27th CPSU Congress, which is taking place in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow.

The Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Congress, which was presented by Comrade Gorbachev, has caused truly colossal interest. Foreign mass media--newspapers, magazines, radio and television--continue to comment widely on it. It has been welcomed with sincerity by our friends in socialist countries, by the progressive public of the globe, and by the people of good will, irrespective of where they live or the views they may adhere to. Even those who never felt any sympathies for our country and our social system listened attentively to the honest, frank, and passionate voice of Moscow, because not to hear this voice today is impossible.

[Zholkver] I would note that a meeting of representatives from the socialist countries of NATO countries has taken place in London. Present here were representatives of the British Labor Party--it was, in fact, at its initiative that this meeting was taking place--together with the Social Democratic Party of the FRG, and the Social Democratic Party of Denmark. A former Norwegian defense minister was present, as was a member of the Dutch Labor Party and a member of the Belgian Socialist Party. It is interesting that the representatives of these socialist parties of NATO countries at their meeting in London called upon the governments of the countries of West Europe to support the Soviet proposal on eliminating all U.S. and Soviet medium-range--intermediate-range as they put it--nuclear missiles in Europe, as proposed by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. They note that there are now no serious obstacles to ridding the whole of Europe of medium-range missiles. True, I have to say that later they do nevertheless say that there is an obstacle to this, the position of the some West European governments, and primarily, of course, the position of the Washington administration itself, which, as it has been phrased here, would like to torpedo an agreement on medium-range nuclear forces.

You know, comrades, that our attitude toward the U.S. position has been mentioned from the congress platform, the fact that the President's letter provides no grounds for amending the assessments of the international situation given in the Central Committee's report before the message was received. What's more, THE WASHINGTON POST admits that Reagan's reply contains no new U.S. positions on the talks. Moreover, the Washington administration has effectively stated that our Soviet proposals on eliminating nuclear weapons by the end of the current century are not suitable for eliminating at the present.

What is happening here? I believe it is worth talking about this, the more so in view of the fact that the Central Committee Political Report stresses that the difficulty with which the ruling classes of the capitalist world are coming to an understanding of the realities, and the periodic recurrences of attempts to resolve by the two worlds are not, of course, fortuitous.

Imperialism is also being driven toward translating the competition between the two systems in the language of military confrontation by its own internal causes, its social and economic essence. As the report says, imperialism, by virtue of its social nature, constantly generates aggressive and adventurist policies. And here one has to talk about a whole set of motives which move it in this direction.

[Agayants] The last point, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, is particularly applicable to the U.S. ruling circles. As the report states, the United States and its military-industrial machine, which does not yet intend to slow down, remain the locomotive of militarism. What is this gigantic machine like?

[Kornilov] Well, vivid indications of this are contained in data such as the following, for example: About half of the industrial potential of the United States is in the hands of members of the Five Hundred Club -- that is what they call the country's 500 major corporations in the United States -- and the list of these is published every year by FORTUNE magazine, the mouthpiece of U.S. big business.

The process of concentrating and centralizing capital, which is taking place at a particularly rapid rate in the U.S. military industry, has led to a situation in which the dominating role amongst them is played today by 100 supergiants, whose share accounts for 65-70 percent of the whole value of military order. This includes up to 35 percent, which is the share of the 10 biggest arms producers. And here are a few more figures. The basic weapons and military equipment systems in the United States are produced by approximately 150 state works and about 4,000 major enterprises belonging to private firms. Altogether, orders for the Pentagon are carried out by 30,000 prime contractors alone, and more than 50,000 subcontractors. The United States, the most developed state of the capitalist world, has essentially been transformed into the state with the most deformed, militarized economy. This is also confirmed by the U.S. military budget for the 1987 fiscal year, which exceeds \$320 billion, a record sum in the country's entire history.

[Agayants] It is precisely this, Yuriy Emmanuilovich, that is stated in the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th Congress of our party. Let me quote: Militarism gorges itself unbelievably on the arms race, striving to gradually obtain the political levers of power. It is becoming the ugliest and most dangerous monster of the 20th century. Thanks to its efforts the most advanced scientific and technical thinking is recast into weapons of mass destruction.

[Kornilov] Over the past 5 years the total profits of just the 10 leading military-industrial corporations have grown by 2.5 times, and their further growth has essentially been assured in the program for U.S. rearmament, which has been worked out by the Republican administration and which is due to run for years to come. The building of a complete series of submarines of the Ohio class, for example -- and the Pentagon intends to have no fewer than 20 such submarines in its fleet by the year 2000 -- will cost approximately \$85 billion. The program for building the B-1 bomber, which is expected to take until 1989 -- 100 aircraft -- will cost \$30 billion. The construction of 1,000 Midgetman missiles will cost a further \$70 billion.

[Agayants] Enormous profits, but even the figures you have given pale noticeably in comparison to the profits expected by the arms kings during the implementation of the program for space militarization that Washington has worked out: a program that the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR calls the Pentagon's last vein of gold in the 20th century.

[Kornilov] That's absolutely right. Let me remind you of the figures. Within the framework of this program, the cost of building a system of stations from space platforms equipped with lasers will amount to \$100-500 billion according to specialists. The cost of taking each platform into orbit will be \$27-28 billion. Expenditure on operating the antimissile system in space will be no less than \$10-15 billion. And the overall cost of the program for setting up a single-layer antimissile system will exceed \$500 billion according to the experts' calculations, while the construction of a multilayer system of this type with several levels in space will cost the American taxpayer \$1.5-3 trillion.

[Zholkver] Now the Pentagon is pushing ahead with development [sozdaniye] of a new aerospace aircraft, the X-30, which is also intended for military use, and the military firms are once again counting on making a profit. I have seen figures such as the following: The cost of the initial experimental design work on the X-30 is alone estimated at \$600-700 million. And it is interesting how this is apportioned: 80 percent of the expenditure is being borne by the Pentagon, and 20 percent by NASA.

[Kornilov] (Grosse), the owner of the Lockheed military industrial giant in California, was once asked why he deals in military aircraft manufacture. That question is as old as the hills, he replied. The Pentagon pays \$100 for every automatic rifle, \$7,600 for a military truck, \$29,000 for an armored troop carrier, \$100,000 for an artillery weapon. That is peanuts. What I manufacture is something else altogether: \$300,000 for a helicopter, \$2 million for a combat aircraft -- profitable, marketable commodities, gentlemen! These words indeed reflect the morals of the U.S. manufacturers of death. This is why the words from the CPSU Central Committee Political Report are so topical today, to the effect that the ruling class of the United States, or more precisely the most egoistic groups in it connected with the military-industrial complex, have different aims which are clearly opposed to our own. For them, disarmament means loss of profits and political risk; for us, disarmament is a boon in all respects, economically, politically, and morally.

[Zholkver] I should like to add to what you have just been saying, Yuriy Emmanuilovich, only that all the points in the Political Report regarding the role of the military-industrial complex hold good, properly speaking, not just for the United States alone.

[Kornilov] Of course, they hold good for West Europe, and first and foremost the FRG.

[Zholkver] Yes, indeed. For instance, even the SDI, the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, which is causing very great misgivings among the general public and the scientific public both in the United States and in West Europe...this is nevertheless attractive to those companies and military concerns both in the FRG and Britain. And in Italy, too, you see, 70 companies have now opted for it in the desire to have a slice of the golden pie being shared out among companies involved in manufacturing space weapons. This must also be taken into account, for it is another factor working against peace, unfortunately. This is frankly discussed in West Europe itself.

The situation emerging at the moment is that Washington rejects our proposals on reducing medium-range nuclear missiles on the grounds that, so they say, the West Europeans are asking them to do so. They like the U.S. Pershings and cruise missiles which the Americans have sited [razmestit] on their territory so much that they simply cannot live without them and are trying to persuade the Americans not to withdraw them from West Europe. Heaven forbid that they should! This is all rubbish! And it should be said that representatives of a whole series of parties -- I shall once again cite here the opinions of social democratic circles who state quite bluntly that this is an attempt to torpedo the possibility of agreement.

[Agayants] It is today more important than ever to find ways toward closer and more productive cooperation with governments, parties, public organizations and movements that are genuinely concerned about the destiny of peace on earth, and with all peoples, in order to create a comprehensive system of international security. This should be mentioned in more detailed, insofar as the foundations of a system, in the military, political, economica and humanitarian spheres, were clearly and precisely expounded in Comrade Gorbachev's speech at the 27th CPSU Congress.

[Zholkver] Yes, we live in the real world, one which is complex and contradictory. In building our international policy we take account of the specific characteristics of the present stage of international development. Analysis of the aspects and prospects led us to the conclusion that it is particularly important now to find ways toward this closer and more productive cooperation among all states in the most diverse spheres.

In the military sphere this involved first and foremost the renunciation by the nuclear powers of war against one another and against third states, both nuclear and conventional war, at that. This involves the impermissibility of an arms race in space, and the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests.

[Kornilov] I should add just one thing to this. When we speak of ceasing nuclear tests, one of the major tasks in regard to curbing the arms race, it is appropriate once again to recall the history of that issue, which the bourgeois press, for example, forgets on purpose. For instance, the fact that the preamble of the treaty concluded as far back as 1963 banning tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in space and under water, which was signed by the United States among others, states that the states signatory to the agreement will strive to achieve the permanent cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons, and that they are full of determination to continue negotiations toward this end.

Twenty-three years have elapsed since then. What has Washington, which, I repeat, signed this treaty, done to fulfill the obligations it assumed? Precisely nothing, as is well known. On the contrary, nuclear tests are continuing in the United States, and, what is more, are continuing in a demonstrative manner as a challenge to the peace-loving public.

[Zholkver] Well, one should add to this that we are also raising the issue of banning and destroying chemical weapons, also weapons of mass annihilation. I should also draw attention in particular to the proposal expounded in the Central Committee Political Report in the political sphere. This involves the unconditional respect in international practice for the sovereign right of each people to choose the ways and forms of their own development. This position is in total contradiction to the U.S. theory, currently very fashionable, of new globalism, which proclaims the U.S. freedom to interfere in the internal affairs of all sovereign states, from the Philippines to Haiti, from Nicaragua to Afghanistan. However, we raise the issue of the need for unconditional respect in international practice for the sovereign right of every people to choose the ways and forms of its own development.

I would add to this the very important tenet in the economic sphere: the exclusion of all forms of discrimination in international practice, the renunciation of the policy of economic blocs and sanctions, and joint search for ways of equitably settling the problem of indebtedness, which, it should be said, is simply strangling the so-called Third World, which is now more than \$1 trillion in debt.

One should also add to this, of course, the proposals for establishing cooperation in the humanitarian sphere, first and foremost cooperation in disseminating the idea of peace and the eradication of genocide and apartheid, which we see is particularly topical now through the example of the RSA.

Thus, this is a very broad-based and, importantly, comprehensive and all-embracing system of establishing international security.

[Kornilov] It is characteristic that precisely these Soviet proposals you are talking about, relating to the establishment of a system of international security, have evoked and are continuing to evoke a particularly widespread and positive response from the international public. This is natural, for the foundations of such a system of security could, if they were adopted, become the point of departure and a sort of framework for direct and systematic dialogue between the leaders of the countries of the world community, both bilateral and multilateral.

Guided by these foundations, it would be possible to make peaceful coexistence really the supreme and universal principle of interstate relations.

[Agayants] The modern world has become too small and fragile for wars and the policy of force. The struggle against war and for peace, mutual understanding and cooperation is for the Soviet people no mere opportunistic propaganda ruse of temporary tactical maneuver, as the bourgeois propagandists incessantly assert. It is a principled and consistent course, the course of peaceful foreign policy bequeathed to us by Lenin.

Our program time has run out. Thank you, comrades, for your attention. All the best to you!

## RELATED ISSUES

### USSR 16 MARCH WEEKLY 'INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS ROUNDTABLE'

LD161849 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 16 Mar 86

["International Observers Roundtable" program, with political observers Aleksandr Yevgeniyevich Bovin and Nikolay Shishlin; and Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, All-Union Radio commentator]

[Excerpts] [Levin] Hello, esteemed comrades. This week's events show that the ideas and solutions of the complex international problems facing mankind advanced by the 27th CPSU Congress are not just finding a wide response among the international public, but are being reflected in the stance taken by a whole range of states. I am thinking specifically of the letter from the so-called Delhi six--that is, the leaders of the following six states: Argentina, India, Mexico, Tanzania, Sweden, and Greece--which once again recently sent messages to the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States containing their proposals and their ideas on improving the international situation. In particular, these leaders express the idea of setting up a system of international security.

It is precisely this aspect that is consonant with the proposal put forth by the Soviet Union -- the proposal was set out in the 27th CPSU Congress Central Committee Political Report -- on setting up an all-embracing system of international security. I am not going to repeat everything that is in this Soviet concept, but I want to draw your attention to the fact that in the military sphere the Soviet Union promotes the idea that the nuclear powers should renounce war, both nuclear and conventional, against each other and against third states. Very closely linked with this is the second proposal, that an arms race in space should not be permitted, that all nuclear weapons tests should be halted, and that these should be eliminated completely; that chemical weapons should be banned and destroyed, and that the development of other means of mass destruction should be renounced. The message from the Delhi six says that it would be very useful, on the threshold of a new Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, if the Soviet Union and the United States were not to carry out nuclear explosions, at least until this meeting.

The position of the Soviet Union is known. Effective last August we unilaterally introduced a moratorium on conducting nuclear explosions whether for military or peaceful purposes. Then, in the Statement on 15 January by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, we extended this moratorium until 31 March. In other words, we gave the Americans an opportunity to consider their position once again and to discuss care-

fully once again the situation that has come about. We made yet another good-will gesture.

[Shishlin] Viktor Nikolayevich, I think that we should add here the fact that the Soviet Union did not simply carry out this good-will act and unilaterally end all nuclear tests. In addition to this, the Soviet Union invited the United States and Great Britain to start talks immediately and without delay in order to conclude a treaty of full value on ending all nuclear tests, naturally with the appropriate monitoring, including on-site inspection, so that there was also a purely working proposal here in order to reach a real agreement. Well, we have said many times what an accord would lead to, because it would indeed signify a great deal in the purely military and technical area too; but the main thing is that it would be a breakthrough toward the creation of a new atmosphere, not just in Soviet-U.S. relations but in international relations in general. But the new position which has been set out in the reply by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to the joint approach by the leaders of the six states amounts to this: The Soviet Union will refrain from carrying out nuclear tests until such time as the United States carries out a nuclear explosion. This is in fact a continuation of the line, the very firm line, aimed at trying to reach a real agreement in so far as the U.S. "no" to all these proposals moves and actions might have consequences on many different planes.

[Levin] I would also say that the reply by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev -- and attention has to be given to this -- puts forth a proposal on working out the treaty you are talking about on banning nuclear tests completely, and there too we are raising the issue in a new way. We are proposing that we set out working on such a treaty without delay and that the appropriate talks be resumed or started in any form, be it bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral talks, and that this not be tied to any other issues. This, too, is a new point, and a very important point which testifies to the constructive nature of our position and a sincere desire to find some points of contact with the Americans.

[Shishlin] From the very beginning it was stated by the Soviet Union that we do not link the ending of nuclear tests with the rejection by the United States of the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, just as we do not link with it the issue -- and the solution of the issue -- of eliminating medium-range nuclear arms in Europe.

[Levin] I am thinking of the fact that now we are also proposing bilateral talks, this is a new point.

[Bovin] Unfortunately, however, there is an old point that can be seen very clearly indeed here, the fact that the Americans are continuing to say the same "no" they have been saying all along, and this is characteristic of Reagan's policy and position. And overall it has to be said that the U.S. position is so vulnerable that from the viewpoint of world public opinion, even from the viewpoint of very many politicians in America itself, Reagan's position is absolutely unconstructive and contradicts common sense. For example, things have reached the point where the U.S. House of Representatives has adopted a special resolution which demands that the U.S. President, in the first place, ratify -- we do not have treaties with the United States; we have signed...



[Shishlin, interrupting] Two.

[Bovin] Two treaties, limiting underground nuclear weapons tests and dealing with nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. We have signed them but the United States has not ratified them. And so the House of Representatives is demanding that the President, in the first place, ratify both these treaties immediately, and second, that he join in talks with the Soviet Union on the conclusion of a treaty on an all-embracing ban on nuclear explosions. The President sent a special letter to the House of Representatives and stated in this letter that this resolution of the House of Representatives runs counter to the interests of the national security of the United States.

The evolution of the U.S. position is very interesting. To begin with it was like this: The Russians do not want to monitor, and if there is not going to be any monitoring then there will be no agreement. Later it became clear that things were not like this at all. By all means, we say, there will be a monitoring system, let us agree and include on-site inspection, in other words, this trump card, this argument, is knocked out of their hand.

They then began talking like this: We need to carry out nuclear tests because we need to modernize our nuclear weapons; the Russians have overtaken us; they have done all they need to; we have fallen behind and we have to catch up. Then it became clear that this was not the truth either. And now, it would appear, there is no room for any further withdrawal, yet Reagan has constructed himself yet another redoubt. His logic is as follows: The nuclear weapons that we currently possess are the main means for deterring the Soviet Union. But in order for this means of deterrence to be good it needs to be tested from time to time, otherwise its reliability will be low.

There are, say, 10,000 warheads in store there: Who knows what happens to them over a 10 year period. In order to be sure, each batch must be tested regularly. And Reagan says to begin with we must reach agreement on reducing nuclear weapons, then afterwards talk about banning tests. That is to say, everything is now being turned the other way around.

Of course, it is sad that the Americans are behaving in this way because all people are now waiting for the second summit meeting. As we know, it would be very good and desirable if it were possible to resolve some specific issues at this meeting. Well, all right, the first time they met, they talked, they to to know each other. On the second occasion it would be desirable to solve some specific problems. There are two problems which are more or less capable of being viewed as candidates for solution: The problem of a nuclear test ban, and the Euroweapons problem. But, unfortunately, the position of the U.S. Administration here, for the present, does not leave any room for optimism, to say the least.

[Levin] I have the impression that the Americans are inclined to create the impression that they very much want the meeting, but in actual fact they really, in a way, do not show genuine interest. Let us take two aspects: The question is always being raised in the United States of the time for a meeting to take place. One high-ranking representative of the administration will speak, then another; then recently Reagan himself joined in the game: He says, well, all right, if June and July are of no use, maybe December. But underneath all these conversations the essence of the problem gets further away. Let us take Reagan's most recent proposal concerning ending nuclear tests: More properly it does not concern ending them. Reagan made a loud-mouthed declaration that he had proposed that the Soviet Union conclude an agreement [soglasheniye] on a new system for observing nuclear explosions.

[Bovin, interrupting] This logic is quite the wrong way round: We propose reaching agreement on control in order that nuclear tests not be carried out. And Reagan [Bovin chuckles slightly] proposes reaching agreement on the control of conducting nuclear tests. There you have, properly speaking, the fundamental difference between the two approaches.

[Levin] Quite right. But conducting nuclear tests does not diminish the acuteness of the problem; if nuclear explosions are to continue then that means the improvement [sovershenstvovaniye] of nuclear weapons will continue; that means the threat is not reduced, is not removed.

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## RELATED ISSUES

### PRAVDA: SWEDEN'S CARLSSON REAFFIRMS PEACE, DISARMAMENT GOALS

PM141151 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Mar 86 First Edition p 5

[Text] Stockholm, 13 Mar -- Sweden's desire to continue to contribute to the attainment of the goals of peace and disarmament has been reaffirmed by the country's new prime minister, I. Carlsson. Delivering a government statement in the Riksdag (parliament) today, he stressed that Sweden will firmly and consistently pursue the policy of neutrality, which guarantees the country peace and promotes stability in northern Europe. It is necessary, he said, to make every effort to lessen and eliminate the threat of nuclear war. In this connection I. Carlsson expressed the hope that talks between the USSR and the United States will lead to the growth of confidence and the lessening of tension and open the way to disarmament.

The government, he stressed, will continue actively to advocate the creation of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe and seek broad support for the proposal to create a zone in Central Europe free from battlefield nuclear weapons. It will implement the initiatives in the disarmament sphere put forward by Sweden together with the other countries which signed the Delhi declaration, with a view to freezing existing nuclear arsenals and completely ceasing nuclear tests.

The prime minister noted that Sweden supports the activity of the United Nations to preserve world peace and came out in favor of the successful completion of the work of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. I. Carlsson submitted to parliament the composition of the new ministerial cabinet. S. Andersson holds the post of foreign minister and R. Carlsson that of defense minister. Then, in accordance with the Constitution, at a special meeting with the participation of the head of state, King Carl XVI Gustaf of Sweden, the change of government took place and the new cabinet began carrying out its duties.

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## RELATED ISSUES

### IZVESTIYA CITES PALME COMMISSION STATEMENT

PM181507 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Mar 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent A. Sychev under the rubric "On Topics of the Day": "Named After O. Palme"]

[Text] Stockholm -- A memorial session of the independent commission on disarmament and security issues has been held in the Swedish capital.

Taking part were Swedish Prime Minister I. Carlsson, G. Brundtland, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Norway, G.A. Arbatov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute, former British Foreign Secretary D. Owen, and a number of other eminent politicians.

In the statement adopted during the session, the commission members expressed their profound condolences in connection with the death of Prime Minister O. Palme, who created and headed the commission. The commission will continue its work aimed at strengthening peace and cooperation between states, to which O. Palme gave his entire life.

The statement says: "In the nuclear age there is no alternative to talks and cooperation between states. Nuclear war must not be unleashed. There will be no victors in it." The commission will concentrate its activity on measures which would lead to the halting of the nuclear arms race, the consolidation of the United Nations Organization, and the strengthening of regional security, including security in Europe. The statement particularly emphasizes the urgent need to make the process of detente and cooperation irreversible.

The commission has urged the nuclear powers to conclude a treaty on the total prohibition of all nuclear tests and to declare a mutual and verifiable moratorium on tests, emphasized the need for the full observance and consolidation of the ABM treaty, and pointed to the importance of abolishing all medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The creation in Europe of a zone free from battlefield nuclear weapons would be an important step on the path of reducing nuclear arsenals, the statement says.

The session decided to continue the work of the commission under the new name "O. Palme Commission for Disarmament and Security Issues." The commission members asked Swedish Prime Minister I. Carlsson to take the place of the chairman, expressing understanding of the difficulty involved in making a decision on this question immediately. The next Palme Commission session will be held 24-26 October this year in Budapest. It will examine questions of European security.

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## RELATED ISSUES

### FRG'S GENSCHER, SCHAEUBLE MEET GDR DISARMAMENT EXPERT

#### Schaeuble Meeting

LD251459 Hamburg DPA in German 1417 GMT 25 Feb 86

[Text] Bonn, 25 Feb (DPA) -- Wolfgang Schaeuble (CDU), head of the Federal Chancellery, received Ernst Krabatsch, GDR disarmament representative, for a talk in Bonn on Tuesday. Krabatsch is in Bonn for an exchange of views with Friedrich Ruth, the Federal Government's disarmament representative. According to a government spokesman, the talk focused on the relations between the Federal Republic and GDR and current international issues.

#### Genscher Meeting

LD261356 Hamburg DPA in German 0948 GMT 26 Feb 86

[Text] Bonn, 26 Feb (DPA) -- The Federal Republic and the GDR intend to continue their exchange of views on disarmament issues "as an important part of the general dialogue," Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and GDR disarmament representative Ernst Krabatsch affirmed in Bonn today. Genscher received the GDR diplomat at the end of the regular consultations which Krabatsch has conducted over the past 2 days in Bonn with his Bonn counterpart, Ambassador Friedrich Ruth. Krabatsch was also received by Minister of State Wolfgang Schaeuble in the Federal Chancellor's Office.

In Genscher's view, these German meetings on disarmament issues ought to deal above all with the problems in those disarmament bodies in which both German states are members. The Foreign Ministry stated that by this Genscher means the Stockholm conference on confidence-building measures and disarmament, the Vienna troop-reduction negotiations, and Geneva's UN Committee on Disarmament.

The federal foreign minister today expressed the hope for "substantial progress" in these three conferences and also paid tribute to Bonn's contacts with the GDR and the CSSR on the issue of the worldwide ban on chemical weapons. The disarmament talks between Bonn and East Berlin are an "important component in the general dialogue" between the two German states, he said.

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ITALY RELEASES 'GIST' OF COSSIGA'S LETTER TO GORBACHEV

AU181607 Rome ANSA in English 1555 GMT 18 Feb 86

[Text] (ANSA) Rome, 18 Feb--Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's recent package of disarmament proposals could provide a "significant contribution" towards inverting the arms race, Italian chief-of-state Francesco Cossiga said in a recent message to the Kremlin leader.

Cossiga replied Saturday to Gorbachev's proposal for a complete ban on nuclear weapons by the year 2000 in a message delivered to the Soviet leader by Italian Ambassador Sergio Romano. The gist of the letter was just released today by sources close to the president.

The Italian statesman acknowledged Gorbachev's concern for world peace and stability, which he said was shared by the Italian Government. He stressed the necessity of providing greater political impetus to disarmament negotiations, especially during the course of 1986, proclaimed the International Year of Peace by the United Nations. Granting the "significant contribution" that Gorbachev's proposals could make to the disarmament process, Cossiga stressed that they would have to be carefully scrutinized at the proper negotiations venue and analyzed from a security standpoint by the Atlantic alliance.

Cossiga confirmed that "general and complete disarmament" was still "the ideal objective," although he stressed that limited achievements were no less important.

The Italian president, like other Western leaders, said Gorbachev's 15 January proposals "appeared to respond to an intention to consolidate the constructive spirit of the Geneva summit." For a conclusion, Cossiga voiced the hope that no stone be left unturned in the search for mutually-acceptable solutions to disarmament problems, particularly within the realm of the Geneva negotiations.

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### FRG CDU/CSU'S WIMMER URGES MORE USSR ARMS PROPOSALS

LD121454 Hamburg DPA in German 1329 GMT 12 Feb. 86

[Text] Bonn, 12 Feb (DPA) -- The defense spokesman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag group, Willy Wimmer, has called on the Soviet Union to submit detailed disarmament proposals also for conventional arms in Europe. After his return from a 7-day visit to the Stockholm conference on confidence-building measures and security and disarmament in Europe, Wimmer pointed out in Bonn on Wednesday that Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev in his latest proposal on nuclear disarmament, practically ignored conventional disarmament efforts.

Wimmer emphasized that Gorbachev should use the impending CPSU party congress "to speak as intensively about disarmament in the conventional sphere in Europe as he has done on nuclear questions". In Wimmer's view the first step in conventional disarmament in Europe could be that on the territories of the European countries no more foreign troops would be deployed.

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